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This thesis analyzes two experiments where experts are facing other-regarding versus
self-interested choices on behalf of their clients. The experimental models isolate and examine
singular aspects of the complex varied transactions that transpire between experts and their
clients every day. Prior literature modeling experts in dictator games or expert advice games
shows that given a clear choice with direct culpability that experts are willing to make “fair”
other regarding decisions that sacrifice some of their own monetary outcome to increase the
outcome for others. However, in these same experiments with the same subject, experts are
willing to hide behind many different mechanisms that remove this clear culpability and thus
divert the blame for their more self-interested choices. Experts are willing to pay $1 to take all
the money and run as though the opportunity to share with others did not exist. When the blame
for the decision can be placed on another person, on the computer, on chance (a payment
distribution with probabilities) the experts tend to switch to less-fair actions. This all implies that
people sometimes make fair choices, but whenever there is a screen of plausible deniability, their
mental accounting avoids personal culpability for an increase in unfair outcomes. These two
experiments test if experts likewise use 1) communication or 2) ambiguity as a deeper screen
v

than uncertainty in order to find a way to justify unfair choices that they would not make without
this opportunity. These economics experiments are performed in a laboratory setting where the
element of interest can be isolated, and the other aspects of the transaction are controlled. But the
fundamental questions being asked are applicable to many common types of commercial
transactions throughout the economy and thus might be informative in thinking about public
policy around expert client transactions.
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CHAPTER 1
Expert Recommendations - Treated With and Without Communication
Behavioral economic laboratory experiments testing the effect of communication on
experts' recommendations to their clients across a spectrum of certain and risky payout to the
client.
1.1 Abstract
Facilitating more communication is frequently proposed to alleviate the predicament of
opposing interests and information asymmetry when an expert makes recommendations to their
client. However, the dictator game and expert advice literature is full of the expert using every
opportunity to obscure their direct culpability to make more self-interested choices. Would
experts likewise use communication to hide culpability thereby making recommendation in the
expert’s best interests and not the client’s. We tested the effect of communication on expert
advice by designing economics laboratory experiments in an expert-advice client-choice game
over safe payoffs and a range of risky payoffs. In some sessions the expert provided a
recommendation supplemented with text communication and in other sessions with different
subjects, the recommendation alone. The experiment did not simply measure the expert’s
assumptions about their client’s risk-averse or risk-loving utility preferences. We designed some
tasks to require extremely risk-averse client preferences to justify the expert's giving selfinterested advice, and other tasks requiring extremely risk-loving preferences. No valid client
risk preference assumption would support both self-interested recommendations; thus, such
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experts can only be self-interested. We use six varied tasks that possess diverse communication
opportunities, to test if communication about varied situations might facilitate different
behaviors. Our small sample size leans towards rejecting that communication increases selfinterested advice; in some instances, the advice is significantly more other-regarding. We
generally observe heterogeneous expert advice and response to communication varying over the
six tasks.
1.2 Introduction and Motivation
Expert interactions with clients often have an information asymmetry, where the client
must rely on the recommendation and information provided by the expert. When the outcome of
this interaction is not aligned, in that the financial benefit of one party comes at the expense of
the benefit to the other party, then the quality of the recommendations of the expert becomes
suspect. The client is paying the expert for advice, yet the expert may be compensated more for
providing the recommendation that is not in the client’s interest. The classic case of this is
repairs by an automobile mechanic or a plumber, but similar issues arise for some of the
transactions in most commercial fields from the grocery store to medical or financial advice. A
better understanding of the expert’s recommendation behavior might provide insight in public
policy and regulations on identifying and protecting the consumer in situations that are most
likely to facilitate adverse advice. Further, exploring the effect of communication on these
recommendations will help to recognize when communication might help or hurt the quality of
the recommendation in different situations.
The experimental economics literature examining other-regarding behavior in dictator
games and expert advice games at first had not anticipated that an expert subject would give to
their counterparty. This was contrary to classical wealth-based economic utility theory. Some
2

additional component of utility, some measure of self-judgment, social-judgment/norms,
fairness, truthfulness, or social welfare was entering into individual's utility choices. In
subsequent experiments designed to further understand these choices, the most universal factor
was that with added levels of complexity the expert decision makers often switched to more selfinterested actions. If all additional distractions and complications increased self-interested
behavior, what about the complexity of communication?
The literature promoting transparent full information disclosure lauds communications as
a cure to all opposing interest interactions. Public policy even follows this mantra. The car
mechanic is required get customer approval of a quote of work to be performed before
proceeding. The doctor is required to get informed consent, when possible. But what if
communication did not improve the experts’ recommendations, and instead experts used
communication as an additional complexity to hide their self-interested actions behind. Shouldn’t
this be tested?
This article primarily examines expert recommendation behavior affecting the welfare of
their client counter-party. We examine the quality of recommendation across a range of certain
and risky payouts as well as testing the effect of providing added communication along with this
recommendation.
The experiment is designed to identify when the expert is taking advantage of any
uncertainty to exercise a self-interested wiggle room. Past experiments have had difficulty
distinguishing self-interested experts from experts making bad assumptions about the utility-risk
profile of their clients. Prior experiments had trouble eliminating the possibility that selfinterested recommendations might arise simply because the expert was making assumptions
about their client’s risk aversion or risk-loving utility function and was making the utility3

maximizing recommendation based on those assumptions. In our experiment, by providing a
variety of different scenarios where the expert’s self-interested choice would alternately require
risk-averse or risk-loving assumptions about the client’s utility function, we are attempting to
distinguish persistently self-interested expert behavior from other behavior.
The probability outcomes for the choices are also designed so that, based on previous
observations of the general population, it would be unlikely that the participant's utility risk
profile would find the choice with a lower expected payment to be beneficial. Thus, even if only
recommendation on one side of the risk-averse or -loving profile were made, the “excuse” that
the recommendations were made on behalf of an assumption about the client’s utility risk profile
would be valid only under extreme profiles.
1.3 Literature Review
There is a very robust literature on dictator games where the expert makes decisions on
behalf of both parties. Although this is may be where one starts to study other-regarding
behavior, it is important to also distinguish that body of literature from the body of literature that
examines the behavior of experts providing advice where the clients are ultimately the decision
makers picking the outcome choice. In this case, the welfare of the client is dependent on the
expert’s assumptions about the client’s preferences, the quality of the expert’s “choice” of
advice, and also the credibility of the advice to inspire the client’s choice. We will examine
behavior across a variety of different tasks that consider outcomes with certain payment and
various probabilistic distributions of payments; thus, delving into individual utility risk
preferences. We will primarily examine the effect of communication on the expert's
recommendations. Following is a review of some of the closer influences on this work, though
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clearly our study of expert recommendations is heavily influenced by the other-regarding choice
literature that uses dictator games that provide no client choice.
First, we acknowledge that choices made on behalf of another might be different from the
choices one makes for oneself. The expert must make assumptions about the client’s utility
preferences; what would the client want? Chakravarty et al, 2011 [9] uses lottery choices and
sealed-bid auctions to assess the choice behavior when choices are made on behalf of the welfare
of another. When making decisions on behalf of the other, the expert advisor makes less riskaverse decisions, than when they are playing the game for themselves and make their own
decisions. Rigoli et al, 2018 [56] similarly observed more risk affinity when making choices for
others, and even observed some risk-loving choices.
In their literature review Dana and Cain, 2015 [14], find that in the absence of contrary
monetary incentives, advice is generally biased towards cautious risk aversion and that wellintentioned policies to promote quality advice often backfire resulting in the opposite effect. That
literature review further finds that some of the advice and choices on behalf of others seems to
come from the fear of being blamed for losses but also not being given credit for gains; thus,
actions on behalf of others are often loss averse. Similarly, Polman and Wu, 2020 [53] in their
meta-analysis found 42 papers and more than 100 mixed findings that overall show a small shift
towards riskier decisions for others.
Gneezy, 2005 [25] constructed a laboratory experiment with many parallels to our
experiment. The comparison was between different payment scenarios as well as comparing the
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recommendation game and a dictator game1. The recommendation game is similar to our
baseline task with certain payments and without communication. Actions on behalf of the other
were heterogeneous and robust, responding to the compensation structure as well as the
recommender versus dictator roles. Rode, 2010 [57] designed an investment-advisor experiment
based on Gneezy, 2005 [25] to test the recommendation and choice behavior when the clients
know more or know less about the setup of the opposing compensation structure of the games.
The expert’s advice does not significantly change under the treatments, but the client’s trust and
rate of following the advice responds to the information when the clients know the payment
interest are not aligned. Although their questions are different and they do not utilize
probabilities and utility risk preferences, Gneezy and Rode have the closest underlying game
structure and experimental design to our experiment, in particular to our base case certain
payment task.
Conflicting interest is the root of the problems with the expert recommender situation.
Angelova and Regner, 2013 [2] test the behavior of an advisor making recommendation for their
client’s market choice. Both their and our baseline treatments with certain payments and without
communication have a similar conceptual setup. They then go on to test fixed and voluntary
payment schemes for the advisor and observe the impact of these different compensation
treatments on the advice give. Similar to aligning the expert and client’s interests, determining
the variable compensation after the results of the game are known had the largest impact on the
quality of recommendations. Popova, 2010 [54] is a prior working paper with similar setup and
results, it would appear to be an early draft. Kuang, Weber and Dana, 2007 [39] adds a third-

In the dictator game the computer had an 80% probability of following the dictator’s choice,
trying to mimic the rate clients that disregarded advice. But based on the results, this probably of
choice may just provide additional wiggle room for more self-interested behavior.
1
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party advisor to experimental coordination games testing advice and choices. The
recommendations of the third-party knowledgeable advisor are followed more frequently when
the third party’s compensation is known not to be aligned to the outcome of the two-player
coordination game that they are providing advice on.
Gehrig et al, 2010 [23] are able to set up a complex investment market in the laboratory
with knowledgeable expert financial advisors sharing their own investment strategies for a fee.
The best-performing markets were those with competition between experts, and not the case
where everyone was knowledgeable of the game state. The interchange and competition of ideas
may have added to the competitive market’s success.
Holt and Laury, 2002 [31] is a classic paper measuring and identifying a scale for
population risk preferences. We utilize their utility function risk scale to design the payment
probabilities in each task of our experiment so that a knowledgeable choice of the lesser $5
payment was either dominated by the $10 choice or would require an unlikely extreme riskloving or extreme risk-averse utility preferences. Thus, were the expert to recommend the $5
choice, this recommendation could only be in the client’s interest were the client to be much
more risk-loving or risk-averse than the general population.
1.4 Experiment Design
To test the effect of communication on expert-client interactions, we conducted
laboratory experiments with college students where designated knowledgeable experts made a
binary recommendation to clients, and the partially-informed clients needed to make the final
decision. In each recommendation task there is an option A that is most beneficial for the client
and an option B that is most beneficial for the expert. The client must rely on the expert’s advice
when making their decision. We investigate the effect of additional expert communication on the
7

client’s welfare. Does additional text communication from the expert to the client provide helpful
transparency and knowledge that improves the client’s outcome, or is communication used by
the expert to facilitate the expert’s own self-interest?
The basic choice for the expert will be the recommendation of A), the high client benefit
with an expected average client benefit of $10 that will pay the expert $4, versus B), the low
client benefit averaging $5 with a payment of $5 to the expert. Option A) could be on the right
side or the left side, and option B) would be on the opposite side. The expert will know the
probability distribution of payment outcomes for both the left and right option. The client will
have limited information, a binary recommendation from the expert sometimes supplemented
with a text communication.
In order to evaluate the effect of communication, we need to be able to identify when the
expert is making a self-interested recommendation. In the simple case, where the client payment
in options A and B is expressed as a certainty of a fixed payment amount, then the larger client
payment in option A is other-regarding for the expert, and option B is self-interested. However,
when option A, option B, or both options include a probability distribution of various payment
amounts, then it is possible that some risk-averse or risk-loving client utility preference may
actually favor client option B even though the expected average payment is smaller. Even in the
case of a task where only an extremely risk-loving or extremely risk-averse client would prefer
option B, if the expert recommends option B it is still difficult to distinguish between an extreme
assumption about the client’s utility preferences or the expert's own self-interested behavior.
Therefore, we have designed pairs of recommendation tasks where the potential rationale for
recommending option B in the first task is incompatible with the rationale in the second task. For
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example, the expert cannot rationally assume that the client is simultaneously extremely riskaverse and extremely risk-loving.
If the expert recommends the self-interested option B in both paired tasks, the only
explanation for the expert’s action is self-interest. Using these pairs of recommendation tasks, we
will be able to identify the use of communication to facilitate persistent self-interested
recommendations versus when communication results in a positive client outcome, possibly
benefiting from transparency. If the expert makes only self-interested recommendations in either
the extremely risk-averse or the extremely risk-loving cases, then it will be harder to identify the
source of their behavior definitively. In the extremely risk-averse case it could be that the expert
feels that they have comfortable wiggle room to justify their recommendation only when the
choice is risk-averse. Even if the preference for a choice at hand required an improbable
extremely risk-averse utility function, the expert may be more comfortable hiding their selfinterested recommendation behind this unlikely risk-averse recommendation but would feel
uncomfortable in doing so with an extremely risk-loving situation. Alternatively, the expert
might believe their client has an extremely risk-averse utility and would thus benefit from such a
recommendation. A similar analysis would apply if the situation were reversed, and extremely
risk-loving recommendation were being made.
Experts may also be basing their recommendations on some other rationalization or be
taking advantage of situations where direct culpability is obscured. Clearly the expert’s behavior
adjusts to their perception of variations in wiggle room under each task and treatment. Such
changes in behavior most likely would reflect the variations of wiggle room and what the expert
feels comfortable getting away with. The point is that the experimental situation pairs are
constructed such that there is not likely to be some consistent rational assumption about the
9

client’s preference, however improbable such an assumption might be. It would be difficult or
impossible to recharacterize the self-interested recommendations in the pairs of tasks as
consistently other-regarding.
There will be two different treatments, with and without communication. Subjects will
participate only in one treatment and the analysis will be between subjects. This design avoids
having the behavior in the with-communication treatment bias the behavior in the withoutcommunication treatment and vice versa. For each pair of expert and client participants, the six
recommendation tasks in their treatment will be presented in a different random order. In the
without-communication treatment, the experts with full information will indicate their
recommended option, and the clients with partial information will receive the expert’s
recommendation before they make their selection. The communication treatment, with a
different group of subjects, will have the fully informed experts indicate their recommended
option along with a text communication. The partially informed client will receive the expert’s
recommendation and communication before they make their selection. In each treatment two
tasks will be randomly selected for payment.
The six different tasks will vary the payment distribution options for the two possible
recommendations. This will change the flavor of the expert’s potential personal justifications and
change the potential in the communication treatment to exaggerate, persuade, obscure
culpability, use half-truths, indicate trustworthiness or character, provide empty justifications,
misrepresent, or deceive their client. The tasks were chosen to span different potential
communication opportunities and challenges for the expert.
Within each treatment round, we will test baseline recommendation tasks as well as pairs
of tasks where recommending both of the self-interested $5 option Bs would require
10

contradictory assumptions about the client’s utility preferences. The recommendation tasks
between two options will be based on a few different probability distributions of compensation
from a fixed set of compensation amounts for the client. Subjects who are assigned the client role
will know about the general structure of the choice problem but will not know the probability
distributions or which choice is more favorable to themselves. During the recommendation and
decision process the clients can speculate about the quality of the recommendations they are
receiving. At the conclusion of the task, in the payment phase, experts and clients will be shown
the payment outcome of all six tasks, this screen will also indicate which one of these tasks was
randomly selected to be paid. Thus, at the end of the session when the clients compare the
recommendations they received with their compensation outcomes for each of the six tasks they
will be able to form an opinion about the quality of the recommendation provided by the expert.
The clients will know only the ex-post outcome not the ex-ante probability distribution, so they
will not know for sure if the expert recommended the choice that they, the client, would have
made for themselves were they to know the same information as the expert.
There will be 6 recommendation tasks. These tasks will be a choice between
recommending the high option A or the low option B where the high option A will on average
pay the client $10 and the low option B will on average pay the client $5. The expert will have
the opposite incentives where they will be paid $4 if the client choses option A and $5 if the
client choses option B. The expert will know the payment distribution of the left and right
options and recommend one to their client. The client’s payment in each task will follow one of
the three probability distribution for the $10 option A and one of the three distributions for the $5
option B. All client payment options will be composed of probabilities of paying $30, $20, $10,
$5, $1 and $0.
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The first distribution will be a “certain” baseline recommendation task where the
payment amount is certain; the high option A always pays exactly $10, and the low option B
always pays exactly $5. Were an expert concerned about culpability or truth telling or the client’s
outcome, it would be difficult to recommend or communicate an argument in favor of the $5
certain option B over the $10 certain option A.
The second distribution type is a “risky” payment distribution where for the mean high
option A compensation is $10, and for the mean low option B compensation is $5, but there is
some chance of each of the possible compensation amounts in each of the distributions. Both the
risky options have a positive probability of paying each of the possible payment amounts: $30,
$20, $10, $5, $1, and $0. These risky payment distributions were selected so that the distribution
of the high payment dominates the distribution of the low payment. Note that throughout this
document we use the words dominate and dominant in their game theory technical sense to
denote the option that yields better payoff than the alternative in all situations, and dominated to
denote the option with lower payoff. The payment probability of each nonzero amount for the
risky high choice will be larger than the payment probability for the risky low choice. Thus, the
only client-oriented justification for recommending the risky low amount over the risky high
amount would be if the lowest payment amount of $0 was desirable for the client. There should
be no “logical” other-regarding justification for picking the dominated $5 risky option B choice
over the dominant $10 risky option A choice.
When a recommendation task is to compare one of these risky options against the
opposite certain options, there is plenty of wiggle room for communications of half-truths that
could be used by the expert to recommend the self-interested low $5 option. However, this is not
the case when both tasks are risky, due to the careful selection of the $10 average option to
12

dominate the probability distribution of the $5 average option. Nevertheless, when both tasks
have risk, the culpability for the outcome is obscured by “probabilities” that provide moral
wiggle room. Because the high payment option dominates the distribution of the low payment it
would be difficult to even write a half-truthful communication to recommend the low payment
option.
Thus, communication might be used to facilitate more low recommendations when only
one task is risky, but communication might actually facilitate more high recommendations when
the high-payment options dominate the low payment both in the case of two certain options as
well as in the case of two risky options.
The third style of distribution will include large probabilities of the lowest or highest,
extreme payments. These downside and upside distributions are more skewed than the risky
payment distributions above. The downside option A, high $10 average payment,
recommendation includes a large probability of downside ($0) potential, and the upside option B,
low $5 average recommendation, includes a large probability of upside ($30) potential.
These downside and upside distributions will be tested against the ordinary risky options.
This will facilitate a situation where both recommendation choices are risky, but there is
something salient to communicate so as to recommend the low $5 option. Not only could the
expert base their recommendation on a risk preference or risk aversion, but the expert could also
communicate about the specific risk of a large downside ($0) or the opportunity of a large upside
($30). These downside and upside tasks are included so as to facilitate opportunities for more
diverse communication about the choices. Communication is not limited to some generic
description of variation and risk, rather it has the potential to focus on a very specific outcome.

13

This will also provide contrast for the dominant risky-risky scenario and potentially show that
experts differentiate between these risky-risky distributions in their behavior.
In addition to the expert being fully informed about the recommendations they can
present to their clients, the clients will be aware of all 6 possible payment amounts ($30, $20,
$10, $5, $1, $0) in the two options. Experts but not clients will know the probability of each of
the 6 payment amounts for each choice in the task. Clients will not know which choice is the
high or low average option. The expert's screen will display the probability of each payment.
Since the high payment is twice that of the low payment, with a little examination it should be
relatively easy for the expert to know which option could be best for the client even though the
expected values of the distributions are not shown and even if the expert does not calculate the
exact expected payments. This however does not prevent the expert for hiding behind strategic
ignorance; the expert could decide strategically to not ascertain which option has a higher
expected payout for their client. This strategic ignorance might assist the expert to be more
comfortable exercising self-interested wiggle room.
Table 1 shows the varying probabilities of each payment distribution recommendation
task described above. First there are the High-mean $10 choice A distributions: Certain, Risky,
and Downside recommendation tasks. Following are the Low mean $5 choice B Distributions:
Certain, Risk and Upside recommendation tasks.

14

Mean

$30

$20

$10

$5

$1

$0

Description

High
CH $10.00
1.000
Certain High
RH $10.00 0.100 0.200 0.200 0.150 0.250 0.100 Risky High dominates RL
DH $10.00 0.100 0.250 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.450 Downside High
Low
CL
RL
UL

$5.00
1.000
Certain Low
$5.00 0.050 0.050 0.150 0.150 0.250 0.350 Risky Low
$5.00 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.710 0.142 Upside Low
Table 1 Payment Distribution of Choices used in Recommendation Tasks

The numbers listed are probabilities of each dollar amount in each distribution scenario. In
various tasks the expert advisor will be presented with pairs of high and low tasks of potential
payout schemes for the other paired participant. The expert will then need to choose to
recommend the high or the low payment option to their other paired participant.

Table 2 itemizes the 6 recommendation-task scenarios utilizing the above variation of
choice options enumerating the probabilities of each payment amount in the choice between
option A) and option B). Following the table is a description and discussion of each
recommendation task.
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High Option
Avg $30 $20 $10 $5
i)

$1

$0

Avg $30

Low Option
$20 $10 $5

$1

$0

Certain High
vs Certain Low (dominated)
$10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
$5 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00

ii) Risky High
vs Certain Low (extreme risk averse choice)
$10 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.10
$5 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
iii) Certain High
vs Risk Low (extreme risk loving choice)
$10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
$5 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.35
iv) Risky High dominates
vs Risky Low (dominated)
$10 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.10
$5 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.35
vs risky Low with large Upside potential
v) Risky High
(extreme risk loving choice)
$10 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.10
$5 0.142 0.00 0.00 0.006 0.71 0.142
vi) risky High with large Downside potential vs Risky Low (extreme risk averse choice)
$10 0.10 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.45
$5 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.35
Table 2 Recommendation Tasks
The numbers listed are probabilities of each dollar amount in each of the 6 tasks. The expert
advisor will be asked to recommend one of these two choices for the payment scheme for the
other paired participant.

Recommendation tasks:
i)

Certain: The “certain” baseline recommendation task is where the high option A and
low option B pay $10 and $5, respectively, with certainty. There is a direct causality
between the expert’s recommendation and the client’s outcome. In the stockbroker
example, this choice is similar to picking between a par value high-interest bond and
a par value low-interest bond with zero risk, where the broker benefits from a higher
commission on the low interest bond. Because the expert’s advice directly defines the
outcome there is no wiggle room; therefore, we expect this recommendation task to
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exhibit a baseline high level of other-regarding behavior. Further in the case of the
added text-communication treatment, there are no persuasive arguments or half-truths
to support recommending the low choice. Due to the general aversion to lying we
would expect the communication treatment to be similarly other-regarding or perhaps
even more other-regarding than the treatment without communication.
The next three recommendation tasks are variations on the risky distribution style.
ii)

Risky High: This recommendation task mixes risky and certain payments. The high
recommendation is risky, and the low recommendation is certain. In the interests of
their client, an expert might switch from the high recommendation to the low
recommendation if they believe their client has a strongly risk-averse utility
preference. The level of risk aversion necessary for a client to desire such a choice
would correspond to r > 0.74, based on the CRRA power utility, which would be
labeled “Very Risk-Averse” by Holt and Laury, 2002 [31].
The risky high recommendation task is similar to most choices a stockbroker
would present to their clients where higher return comes with higher risk. The broker
and client need to balance the desire for return with the aversion to risk as in the
choice between a bond (certain income) investment versus a riskier stock investment.
However, in the stockbroker case, if investors were well informed, only a “Very RiskAverse” investor would forgo the risky higher return.
The risky payment option decouples direct culpability for the outcome from the
expert’s recommendation, providing moral wiggle room for making self-interested
recommendations. Thus, we expect more self-interested recommendations than in
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task i). Further the communication treatment has convenient persuasive half-truths as
well as possible risk-aversion preferences to support a robust communication
recommending the low $5 choice. It is plausible that communication could further
facilitate self-interested recommendation in this task.
iii)

Risky Low: This recommendation task also mixes risky and certain payments but in
the opposite format compared to the previous task. The high recommendation is
certain, and the low recommendation is risky. An expert might in the interest of their
client recommend the low choice if they believe that their client has a strong affinity
for risk. This is not the usual type of investment recommendations that brokers would
make, but it would be similar to a broker recommending a low-return risky
investment instead of recommending a bond with higher certain returns. The level of
risk aversion necessary for a client to desire such a choice would correspond to
r < -1.23, based on the CRRA power utility, which would be labeled “Highly Risk
Loving” by Holt and Laury, 2002 [31].
As in task ii) the risky payment option removes direct culpability enabling moral
wiggle room and self-interested recommendations. Further the robust communication
options of half-truths or risk-loving preferences could further facilitate self-interested
recommendation in the communication treatment, though it may be harder actually or
morally to sell a risk-loving preference here compared to the risk aversion preferences
in ii).
The assumption about the client’s utility preferences needed to justify a low
recommendation in this task iii) is contradictory to that in task ii). Thus ii) and iii) are
a pair of tasks requiring opposite justifications for the low option B recommendation.
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We will utilize this property in our hypothesis test to identify overtly self-interested
behavior.
iv)

Dominated Both Risky: This recommendation task uses the two risky payment
options. The High-Risky distributions choice dominates the Low-Risky distributions
choice. Each nonzero amount for the High-Risky choice has a larger or equal
probability of payment than for the Low-Risky choice. Other than self-interest, there
is no sensible justification for recommending the low choice over the high choice;
such a recommendation would have to assume that the client desired a higher chance
of the lowest outcome, $0. This would be similar to a broker evaluating a high-return
and a low-return stock investment with similar risks for a client yet recommending
the lower-return investment as the broker’s commissions was larger.
The expert's thought process might be that the uncertainty provided by risk is
sufficient moral wiggle room to prevent detection by the client of the expert’s selfinterested action. On the other hand, it is possible that the expert's propriety extends
to their own ability or a knowledgeable observer’s ability to identify a self-interested
action; then the expert may have inhibitions against making the self-interested
recommendation just as in the case of certain recommendation task i). We would
expect the self-interested actions to fall between the low rate in task i) and the higher
rates in tasks ii) and iii).
Unlike the two previous tasks where a strongly risk-averse or strongly risk-loving
utility preference might favor the low option B, in this task, because the high option
A dominates the low option B, there is no sensible risk-averse or risk loving nor any
other utility function that would prefer option B over option A. Nonsensical
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preferences might include a preference for the minimum payment of $0, a preference
to minimize the outcome, a preference to minimize the variance (decreasing the
variance by 20%) thereby also minimize the expected outcome (cutting the expected
outcome in half). As in the certain task i) we expect that the tendency towards
avoiding outright lies in communication has the potential to facilitate more otherregarding recommendation in the communication treatment. Further, we could
examine communication from the expert to their client in order to determine whether
any less-parametric examination might support recommending the dominated low
option B. At this time, we are not aware of any such preference or sales pitch.
The last two recommendation tasks test large probabilities of the extreme upside
and extreme downside compensation.
v)

Upside: The low $5 mean choice has a large probability of upside ($30) reward,
whereas the high choice is the same as the High-Risky choice above. The high
potential upside is available only with the low $5 mean, so there is a tradeoff between
the large potential of a high payment in a choice with a low average payment. This
upside potential might rationally be picked were only the highest payment to provide
utility (and all the other payments have equal low utility even though the payment
amounts varied). In the stockbroker example, the low average return with high upside
potential is most like an investment where the broker’s sales pitch focuses only on the
most favorable outcome and conveniently forgets to address risk or average expected
return. A preference for large upside potential could also be expressed as an affinity
for risk (lottery loving). For a client to desire such a choice based on the CRRA
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power utility it would be necessary for r < -3.11, this being “Highly Risk Loving” as
labeled by Holt and Laury, 2002 [31].
Not only does this task provide more uncertainty that facilitates moral wiggle
room, but it provides many relevant ways to communicate recommendations for the
low $5 option. We would expect that this task has at least if not more self-interested
recommendations as tasks ii) and iii), and that there is the potential for the
communication treatment to facilitate even more self-interested action than the
treatment without communication.
vi)

Downside: The high $10 mean choice has a large probability of downside ($0)
potential, while the low choice is the same as the Low-Risky choice above. Here, not
only does the high choice option have risk, but it also has a large probability of
downside potential even though the average compensation is favorable. Using the
stockbroker example, this could be like a broker trying to scare their clients away
from the higher return stock by focusing only on the worst possible downside
outcome so that they can sell a higher commission still risky lower return investment
opportunity.
One justification for recommending the low choice in v) or vi) would be based on
the utility preference that values either the upside or the downside potential. A
justification for v) would focus on the upside and a justification for vi) contrarily
would focus on the downside, so recommending the low option in both cases would
stretch rationality. We will utilize this pair of recommendation tasks, v) and vi), with
opposing justification in our hypothesis testing to identify overtly self-interested
behavior.
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Alternatively, these upside and downside potential tasks v) and vi) could be
examined through the risk-aversion-utility preference lens or other measure of
outcome-variance preferences. A preference to avoid a large downside potential could
also be expressed as an aversion to risk. The level of risk aversion necessary for a
client to desire such a choice would correspond to r > 0.88, based on the CRRA
power utility, which would be labeled “Very Risk Averse” by Holt and Laury, 2002
[31]. The high upside and downside choices are riskier and have higher variance than
the alternative risky choices. Thus, the risk aversion and affinity analysis already
applied in ii) and iii) would show v) and vi) to be a pair of tasks requiring
incompatible utility preference on risk to justify the recommendation of the Low $5
option B in both cases.
As with task v) the uncertainty in task vi) provides moral wiggle room; further,
there are multiple ways to communicate recommendations for the low $5 option.
Similar to v) we would expect that vi) has at least as many if not more self-interested
recommendations as the risky tasks ii) and iii) as well as more self-interested action
than the same task in the treatment without communication.
As indicated in task iv), we could examine the communications in tasks v) and vi)
for any additional persuasive points of persuasion used by experts to recommend
option B.
In each paired task, a utility-preference reason for recommending option B makes a very
improbable assumption about the client’s utility preference and recommending option B in both
tasks has no excuse but greed.
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We will test the six recommendation tasks and run the two treatments with and without
communication on separate test subjects. Thus, our analysis of the communication treatment will
be between-subject tests. A primary focus of our analysis will be the effect of communication on
the outcome for the clients. We will also utilize the features of the paired recommendation task
to further analyze if any types of tasks have more favorable client outcomes and if
communication affects the outcomes of the tasks in the same way or differently.
Unfortunately, due to the limitations during COVID, the economics laboratory at SMU
was initially shut down for more than a year. With the vaccine, masks, and the resumption of
some activities, the economics laboratory has been able to reopen; however, it has been very
difficult to recruit subjects and several sessions had to be canceled when one or zero students
showed up. Thus, the dataset we have collected for this paper is a small. A total of 34 subjects
participated in 5 sessions. For testing the interaction between pairs of subjects we have only 17
data points; of this we have 7 data points for the control no-communication treatment and 10 data
points for the communication treatment.
1.5 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section we detail the various Hypotheses to be statistically examined in the
subsequent results section.
Hypothesis 1: There exist situations, such as in our recommendation task i) where each
possible recommendation has a single outcome and thus the outcome is certain, yet some
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“expert” subjects will make recommendations against their own self-interest to help
others by recommending option A.2
First, we will confirm that some participants in recommendation task i) do indeed make
the other-regarding recommendations as would be consistent with a large body of literature on
other-regarding actions.
Hypothesis 2: Some of the experts who are other-regarding (recommend option A) in
the certain baseline recommendation task i) will become self-interested (recommend
option B) when there is wiggle room such as risk in tasks ii) and iii).
The tasks Risky High ii) and Risky Low iii) have risky options where one of the
recommendations has more than one possible outcome. This risky option could provide an
assumed excuse or just wiggle room from the uncertainty for the expert to recommend the Low
$5 option B. We will test if risky recommendation tasks ii) and iii) have more self-interested
recommendations than the certain baseline task i). We will distinguish (a) actions that might be
explained by the expert having specific assumptions about the client’s utility function from (b)
self-interest actions. This will be done by testing pairs of recommendation tasks that would

2

In addition to testing the 10 data points of the with-communication treatment and the 7 data
points of the without-communication treatments separately, because of the small sample size we
will also perform tests with the combined sample of 17 data points. Although we should not
make any definitive conclusions from this combined analysis, it will help us asses if more data
collection might lead to results that might be more statistically significant. Were it desired to
actually make inferences from testing the combined data we would need to show that the two
samples were themselves not statistically different. Given that we are trying to get around an
inconclusive test with a small sample size and create a larger sample to test, it is unlikely that
such test would be conclusive. This combined testing will be done for Hypothesis 1-5.
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require opposite contradictory preferences in the client’s utility function to justify the expert
acting self-interestedly in both recommendation tasks ii) and iii).3
Not only would we be confirming the results reported in prior experiments that observed
a self-interested shift in behavior in the presence of “risk” as wiggle room, but we may also be
showing that for some of the recommender population this self-interested action cannot be
justified by assumptions about the client’s utility preferences. To the extent that experts only
make one of the low recommendations in the risky recommendation tasks ii) and iii) our
assessment of their motivations would be indeterminate as they could be self-interested, or they
could have unlikely but possible assumptions about the strong risk preference of their clients.
Experts who consistently make other-regarding recommendations will be viewed as
other-regarding.4
Our sample size is too small to attempt to consider, identify, and adjust our results for
strategic self-interested experts who are not playing the simple unsophisticated pure selfinterested strategies, but we will nonetheless examine this case from a theoretical point of view.
There may be sophisticated self-interested experts who believed that there are so many selfinterested experts that clients might start doubting the recommendation (potentially making the
opposite choice from the recommendations). These sophisticated self-interested experts might
find it advantageous to recommend A in the hopes that the client would choose B some of the

3

Given our small sample size this test may be problematic or statistically inconclusive, at best
we can show the numeric count of participants in each category.
4
We may be slightly overestimating this group to include a small fraction of the strategic selfinterested experts playing a mixed strategy [if their strategy was at a rate of p recommend A, and
(1-p) recommend B and there was k fraction of such sophisticated expert then p2k strategic selfinterested participants would be mistaken for other-regarding]. Any self-interested experts who
are unsophisticated playing pure strategies will not make any other-regarding recommendations
and thus will not be included in this count.
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time. They would maximize their return playing a mixed strategy making recommendations for
both A and B randomly at different times. 5
Hypothesis 3: In recommendation task iv) where the risky-high option dominates the
risky-low option, recommenders will be more self-interested (recommending option B)
than the baseline certain task i), but less self-interested than the risky vs. certain tasks ii)
and iii).
If experts make more self-interested recommendations in the risky-dominated
recommendation task than in the risky vs. certain tasks, then they clearly do not care about the
appearance of propriety (the existence of an assumption that justifies their action) to themselves,
the experimenter, or to other knowledgeable observers who can identify that A dominates B. The
only reason such an expert might be more self-interested is that they felt that there was less
scrutiny in this task where all payments are random. Then a non-knowledgeable observer, such

5

There may be cases where more than half of the experts are other-regarding. Then the selfinterested sophisticated strategist will play a pure self-interested strategy.
If more than half are unsophisticated self-interested pure strategists (always give the selfinterested and not other-regarding recommendation), then the clients should always do the
opposite of the recommendation. In this case, strategic self-interested experts will actually give
the other-regarding recommendation expecting the client to do the opposite.
If the mix of other-regarding participants was R and un-sophisticated Self-interested was S; then
the fraction of self-interested sophisticated strategists T = 1-R-S will recommend the otherregarding option t = (0.5-R)/(1-R-S) of the time, and (1-t) = (0.5-S)/(1-R-S) will recommend the
self-interested option. This will result in the self-interested option being recommended in both
cases (1-t)2T of the time by such experts.
In truth it may be a little more complicated than this as there is a middle group who, depending
on the available wiggle room, will switch between making other-regarding R type
recommendation and self-interested S type recommendations. However, the strategic players T
could assess the portion of experts switching between these two strategies and calculate their
own probability distribution for that scenario based on the proportion of experts playing the R
and S strategies for that scenario. Using this updating strategy, the formulas above would hold,
but need to be different for each scenario.
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as their client, could not determine the quality of their recommendation based on the outcome of
the task and the payment drawn for the client.
If Hypothesis 3) is correct, then to some extent experts care about the appearance of
propriety to knowledgeable observers including themselves.
If participants were more other-regarding in the risky dominated recommendation task iv)
than in the certain baseline i), then they would somehow have failed to realize that in the certain
baseline tasks the certain high outcome dominates the certain low outcome even more strongly
than the probability distributions in iv). It is most likely that iv) is more self-interested than i)
though in many ways this can be viewed as a linked pair of tasks where the high $10 option A)
choice dominates the low $5 option B) choice. In many ways we expect the behavior in these
two tasks to be similar, albeit for the risk component of both options in task iv). Thus, the
difference between these two tasks can be viewed as the wiggle room taken by the expert for the
existence of uncertainty in both options of task iv) even though there is no utility preference
justification in either task. This is slightly different than the wiggle in task ii) and iii) that could
be justified by assumptions about the client’s strong risk utility preference, even though those
assumptions are contradictory if the low options is recommended in both tasks.
Hypothesis 4: Some of the experts who are other-regarding (recommend option A) in
the risky recommendation tasks ii) and iii) will be become self-interested (recommend
option B) when there is the additional wiggle room of upside or downside potential tasks
v) and vi). Combining with Hypothesis 2: Some of the experts who are other-regarding
(recommend option A) in the certain baseline recommendation task i) will be become
self-interested (recommend option B) when there is the additional wiggle room of upside
or downside potential tasks v) and vi)
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Here in addition to utilizing the wiggle room provided by risk (outcomes are not certain
and the client cannot directly trace the outcome to the quality of the expert’s recommendation),
experts are also able to justify their action by recommending the alternative with upside potential
or avoiding the alterative with downside risk. As there are more hypothetical ways to justify selfinterested action, we expect to observe additional self-interested behavior. As in Hypothesis 2,
again we have a matched pair of contradictory justifications for making the self-interested
recommendation that will help us identify purely self-interested actions from recommendations
that might have a justification through assumptions about the client’s preferences. Here in
recommendation task v) the expert would need to focus on the upside potential, overriding
consideration of average return and in vi) the expert would need to focus on the downside risk,
overriding consideration of average return.
We will test if the upside potential recommendation task v) and the downside risk task iv)
have more self-interested recommendations than the risky-dominated task vi). Further we will
test if experts use contradictory justification for their self-interested recommendations by
choosing both of the contradictorily justified self-interested recommendations in v) and vi). We
will be increasing the depth of the experimental literature on self-interested wiggle room to
include large upside and downside potential, as well as showing that the double version of selfinterested action in these tasks cannot be justified by assumptions about the client’s utility
preferences.
We could also draw similarities between risk affinity and aversion profiles in these
upside and downside recommendation tasks with the risky tasks ii) and iii) in that the selection of
the low option B in both pairs of tasks could involve an assumption about risk preferences.
Though risky versus certain task ii) and iii) are simpler than the upside and downside tasks as the
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risky option is compared to the certain task in ii) and iii). Thus, this comparison would have
multiple reasons for differences and the potential root cause of any difference could not be
isolated to one reason.
Following are the central theses of our test of the effects of communication:
Hypothesis 5: Communication will be used to rationalize or justify bad
recommendations enabling recommenders to be more self-interested (recommend option
B) than recommendation tasks in the without communication treatment.
Hypothesis 6: The communications treatment will have less self-interested (recommend
option B) effect on the two recommendation tasks where the high option dominates the
low option in the certain recommendation task i) and the risky dominated task vi).
Despite all the hopes that the transparency of communication can help improve the
quality of recommendations, when the expert recommender controls the content of this
communication, the communication can be used to select only part of the picture (possibly even
without lying) to promote the recommenders’ self-interests. The communication in this
experiment is unstructured and thus the expert may be more prone to self-interest and
manipulation of the communication than in more structured communication environments. Given
the opportunity to use the communication of selective half-truths to promote one’s self-interest,
subjects in the expert role could utilize this wiggle room more than when they lack the ability to
focus the choice on facts favorable to their interests. Thus, they might be less bound by propriety
when able to shift the focus with communication. A failure of rejection of Hypothesis 5 would
support these interpretations.
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However, in some tasks particularly the baseline certain recommendation task i) and also
the risky dominated task iv), have fewer facts that can be manipulated towards the expert’s selfinterests. Then, it is possible that experts will remain more other-regarding than in the other
communication recommendation tasks where elements of uncertainty or risk preferences could
be highlighted in order to promote the low option B selection. This interpretation would be
supported if Hypothesis 6 is not rejected.
This experiment was designed to test paired tasks [ii) and iii) as well as v) and vi)] to
show that self-interested behavior (recommending B) in both tasks could not be justified by
consistent assumptions about the client’s utility function. However, there is also the possibility
that self-interested behavior is more prevalent in risk-averse or risk-loving tasks. If this is
observed, then the direction of this action can be tested to see if that direction of action is
significant. However, the design of this experiment does not have a definitive way to distinguish
between two explanations: Is this action necessarily due to assumptions about the client’s utility
function? Or is the action merely due to the expert’s comfort that the task provided a better
wiggle room opportunity. Those potentially making judgement about this action would be more
comfortable with a recommendation that might be explained by that utility risk profile.
Presumably in either case, the assumption or the comfort, would be biased towards selfinterested action that was consistent with risk-aversion and that is generally the risk profile used
to describe expected human behavior or prudent behavior.
1.6 Results
We test six recommendation tasks and two treatments, with and without communication.
Pandemic restrictions severely limited our sample size. Where possible we performed statistical
tests, even if the expectation was that it would be difficult to show significance. We considered p
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values less than 0.05 to be significant, but all findings should really be taken just as a preliminary
investigation and suggestive of what further investigations might find.
First, we summarize the results of the experiments in Table 3 through Table 6. Clients are
presented with six different tasks with different distributions in the high- and low-payment
categories numbered i to vi, as described in section 2.4 Experimental Design. The payment
categories are Certain, Risky, $30 Upside, or $0 Downside. Table 3 presents the control runs
with no communication. There the expert can only recommend the left or right option to the
client. The table summarizes what fraction of the time the expert recommended the high $10
option and what fraction of the time the client received $10. The expert usually recommended
the $10 option only for the baseline i task where both payments are certain and for task v with
the $30 Upside, but otherwise gave more self-interested recommendations. The outcomes chosen
by the clients are not identical to the expert recommendations. In aggregate 50% of the time the
high option is recommended, and 52% of the time the high option is chosen, but 31% of the time
the advice is not followed. When the advice is not followed, presumably there is distrust in the
motives and advice of the expert; it may be that the client believes the advice to be wrong and is
simply following a strategy of doing the opposite, or there may be a more complex mixed
strategy in play.
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Control
No Communication
A Expert's Advice B Client's Choice
#
$10
$5
N n $10 Fraction n $10 Fraction
i Certain
Certain
7
5
0.71
4
0.57
ii Risky
Certain
7
3
0.43
4
0.57
iii Certain
Risky
7
2
0.29
4
0.57
iv Risky Dominates Risky
7
4
0.57
2
0.29
v Risky
$30 Upside 7
6
0.86
6
0.86
vi $0 Downside
Risky
7
1
0.14
2
0.29
Table 3 Control. Expert and client responses with no Communication to client
The control had 7 expert client pairs (N). Fraction in A is the fraction of time the expert
recommends the high $10 choice, n/N. Fraction in B is the fraction of time the client's choice
resulted in a $10 payoff, n/N.

The second treatment, presented in Table 4, is the communication treatment, where the
expert, in addition to recommending the left or right option, provides text communication about
the recommendation to the client. Here the high option is recommended 70% of the time, and the
high option is chosen 60% of the time. The advice is ignored 27% of the time (similar to the 31%
without communication); however, because of the influence of communication, it would be hard
to isolate the difference between simply not trusting the expert (as in the no communication
treatment), or not trusting the particular text of the recommendation as the reason for provoking
either an opposite choice or a mixed strategy. The statistical significance in the improvement in
other-regarding recommendation will be explored when testing the hypotheses.
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#
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi

$10
Certain
Risky
Certain
Risky Dominates
Risky
$0 Downside

$5
Certain
Certain
Risky
Risky
$30 Upside
Risky

Treatment
Communication
A Expert's Advice B Client's choice
n $10 Fraction n $10 Fraction
8
0.80
8
0.80
4
0.40
3
0.30
8
0.80
8
0.80
8
0.80
7
0.70
10
1.00
5
0.50
4
0.40
5
0.50

N
10
10
10
10
10
10

Table 4 Treatment. Expert and client responses with communication to the client
The treatment had 10 expert client pairs (N). Fraction in A is the fraction of time the expert
recommends the high $10 choice, n/N. Fraction in B is the fraction of time the client's choice
resulted in a $10 payoff, n/N.

Table 3 and Table 4 are the raw data. Now we proceed to compile them in different ways
for our tests. Due to the small sample size, some of the hypotheses will have to be tested using
the combined results of the communication and control treatments. These aggregated results are
summarized in Table 5. The behavior of both expert and client differs between the tasks, and the
statistical significance of this will be tested.

#
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi

$10
Certain
Risky
Certain
Risky Dominates
Risky
$0 Downside

$5
Certain
Certain
Risky
Risky
$30 Upside
Risky

N
17
17
17
17
17
17

Total of
Treatment and Control
A Expert's Advice B Client's Choice
n $10 Fraction n $10 Fraction
13
0.76
12
0.71
7
0.41
7
0.41
10
0.59
12
0.71
12
0.71
9
0.53
16
0.94
11
0.65
5
0.29
7
0.41

Table 5 Total – Aggregate of Treatment and Control
Aggregate of 7 trials in Table 3 and 10 trials in Table 4. Fraction in A is the fraction of time the
expert recommends the high $10 choice, n/N. Fraction in B is the fraction of time the client's
choice resulted in the high $10 payoff, n/N.
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Other hypotheses concern the differences between the control and the communication
treatments. These differences are summarized in Table 6 for analysis. Communication tended to
have a positive effect on most of the recommendations except task ii. The behavior differs
between treatments and tasks; the significance of this will be examined by the later hypotheses.
Control
No Communication
A
B
#
$10
$5
N Fraction Fraction
i Certain
Certain
7 0.71
0.57
ii Risky
Certain
7 0.43
0.57
iii Certain
Risky
7 0.29
0.57
iv Risky Dominates Risky
7 0.57
0.29
v Risky
$30 Upside 7 0.86
0.86
vi $0 Downside
Risky
7 0.14
0.29

Treatment
Difference
Communication
Com-Cont
A
B
A
B
N Fraction Fraction Advice Chose
10 0.80
0.80
0.09 0.23
10 0.40
0.30
-0.03 -0.27
10 0.80
0.80
0.51 0.23
10 0.80
0.70
0.23 0.41
10 1.00
0.50
0.14 -0.36
10 0.40
0.50
0.26 0.21

Table 6 The Effect of Communication
Fraction in A is the fraction of time the N experts recommend the high $10 choice. Fraction in B
is the fraction of time the N clients’ choice resulted in the high $10 payoff. The last two columns
show the change in fraction attributable to communication calculated as a difference:
Communication - Control [denoted as Com – Cont].

The rest of this section will use these experimental results to test the Hypotheses put forth
in the previous section. Occasionally we used the combined treatments or tasks in an attempt to
stretch the sparse data as far as possible in detecting potential trends. If we had more data, this
would not be necessary.
We now consider Hypothesis 1, that some experts will make other-regarding
recommendations that are contrary to their self-interest. We will test the control and treatment
groups first separately and then combined to show that in certain-certain scenario i) some expert
participants make the high $10 recommendation rather than the low $5 recommendation. Selfinterested experts could exhibit one of two possible strategies: a pure strategy of recommending
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the low $5 choice, or a random mixed strategy that conveys no information by recommending
each choice with some probability. These probabilities might take maximum advantage of the
mix of behavioral strategies of clients. In the simplest case this could be equal probabilities.
Thus, a selection of self-interested experts might recommend the high $10 choice somewhere
between never or half of the time. Therefore, we will test if the recommender population lies
anywhere on this spectrum between 0 and 0.5. We utilize the cumulative Beta distribution, to see
what the probability is that the observed sample has an expected probability X between 0 and
0.5. Even with this very small sample the treatment and total population have a p value less than
0.05; thus, it is rejected that these experts are acting in a self-interested manner, see Table 7.
Even the small control population has a tendency towards other-regarding behavior, though it is
not statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the large body of literature on otherregarding behavior.
n recommending Fraction Beta Distribution
N
$10
X
p value X<0.5

Test group
i) $10 Certain High vs $5 Certain Low
Control with No Communication
7
Treatment with Communication
10
Total
17

5
8
13

0.71
0.80
0.76

0.1094
0.0195
0.0106

Table 7 Testing Task i) $10 Certain High vs $5 Certain Low for Other-Regarding Behavior.

Next, we consider Hypothesis 2, that experts take advantage of wiggle room. We will test
if experts make more self-interested recommendations in the task with risky payout distributions.
We will test risky-high ii) and risky-low iii), compared with the certain payout in baseline task i).
For these and subsequent comparisons, testing the null hypothesis if two samples exhibit the
same behavior, we will utilize both a Chi-Squared test and a student-t test, on the various
populations we can test separately and combined. In this case we can test the 2 x 2 matrix of:
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control and communication treatments for tasks ii) and iii); the combined subtotals and grand
total can all be tested against the base case certain task i). The data for this test are compiled in
Table 8.

#
i
ii
iii

$10
Certain
Risky
Certain
Total

Control
No Communication
A
B
$5
N
$10
$10
Certain
7
0.71
0.57
Certain
7
0.43
0.57
Risky
7
0.29
0.57
Risky ii & iii 14
0.36
0.57

Treatment
Communication
A
B
N $10 $10
10 0.80 0.80
10 0.40 0.30
10 0.80 0.80
20 0.60 0.55

Total
Com & Cont
A
B
N $10 $10
17 0.76 0.71
17 0.41 0.41
17 0.59 0.71
34 0.50 0.56

Table 8 Hypothesis 2 – risky vs. certain wiggle room behavior – compare tasks ii and iii vs. i.
A $10 is the fraction of time the N experts recommend the high $10 choice. B $10 is the fraction
of time the N clients’ choice resulted in the high $10 payoff. The total combines the
communication treatment [Com] and the control without communication [Cont].

The above risky task ii), certain task iii), and combined subtotals are all tested to see if
they have less other-regarding behavior than the baseline certain task i). Table 9 shows the onesided student t-test statistics. Although there are four significant results in the first row, for most
segments of the data the behavior was not significantly changed.
Control
No Communication
A
B
#
t-test
t-test
ii $10 Risky vs. i Certain 0.158
0.500
iii $5 Risky vs. i Certain 0.063
0.500
Total ii & iii vs. i Certain 0.068
0.500

Treatment
Communication
A
B
t-test
t-test
0.037 0.012
0.500 0.500
0.145 0.096

Total
Com & Cont
A
B
t-test t-test
0.019 0.044
0.143 0.500
0.036 0.160

Table 9 Hypothesis 2 – student t-test risky vs. certain wiggle– compare tasks ii and iii vs. i.
t-test shows the one-sided student t-test statistics that the i) certain task is more other-regarding.
The total combines the communication treatment [Com] and the control without communication
[Cont].
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Continuing with Hypothesis 2, that experts take advantage of wiggle room, we will use
the data of Table 8 and the statistics of Table 9. In particular for the control no-communication
treatment as well as for risk-loving scenario iii) $10 certain or $5 risky, the outcome choices
made by the client (participant B) were not distinguishable from the baseline certain task i).
Compared to the baseline certain i) there was a significant shift towards self-interested
recommendations in the risk-averse scenario ii) $10 risky or $5 certain options when
supplemented with communication (t-test 0.037), and the client's choices also shifted towards
more expert-self-interested choices (t-test 0.012). On the other hand, in all the other scenarios
[both ii) and iii) no communication controls as well as iii) communication treatment] the choice
outcome showed no deterioration towards expert directed self-interested outcomes. Further the
recommendations in the communication treatment iii) task did not shift.
In the no-communication control task iii) $10 certain or $5 risky options, the expert
recommendations tended to be more self-interested, although this difference was not statistically
significant (t-test 0.063). This task is anomalous in that even though the recommendations
shifted towards self-interested, the client choice outcomes seemed not to shift at all, but likely
this should not be interpreted as a result. What is strange, is that this is the no-communication
control, and there should be no way for the client to determine when the recommendations are
good or bad. Perhaps because of the random draw of this small sample size clients in this case
were randomly lucky at guessing when to not believe the recommendations, an anomaly we
might expect to disappear in a larger sample.
Although the total results show a statistically significant improvement in other-regarding
recommendations (t-test 0.036), there is heterogeneity in the behavior observed when analyzed
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by treatment and task characteristics. The clients' choices show a shift that is not statistically
significant (t-test 0.16). A larger sample size might provide more clarity.
The experiment was designed to test recommendation task pairs (tasks ii and iii) that
would require opposite and conflicting assumptions about the client’s risk preferences in order to
justify that the expert make self-interested recommendations in both tasks. We will show the data
parsed in a way appropriate for this analysis, but the small sample size does not allow statistical
analysis, see Table 10. The observed behavior is heterogeneous, and we cannot extract a trend
without more participants.
Control
No Communication
A Advice
n
Fraction
Risky ii) & iii)
3
0.43
Both Self-Interested
1
0.14
Only Risk-averse ii)
2
0.29
Only Risk Loving iii)
3
0.43
Total Mixed
0.14
Both Other-Regarding 1
7
N pairs

Treatment
Communication
A Advice
n
Fraction
1
0.10
5
0.50
1
0.10
6
0.60
3
0.30
10

Total
Com & Cont
A Advice
n Fraction
4
0.24
6
0.35
3
0.18
9
0.53
4
0.24
17

Table 10 Hypothesis 2 – analysis of paired task ii and iii.
A Advice Fraction is the total fraction of experts exhibiting that behavior in tasks ii) and iii). The
total combines the communication treatment [Com] and the control without communication
[Cont].

The data in Table 10 are set up to show how analysis would proceed with a larger data
set. Starting with the traditional coding, for each task any other-regarding
recommendation/decision is coded with $10 A = 1 and $5 B = 0. In this traditional coding AA =
2, AB and BA =1 and BB =0. Here instead a categorical coding is used: AA = other-regarding,
AB and BA = potentially motivated by one type of extreme risk preferences, and BB = selfinterested. We could analyze the mix of the population in these categories under 2 x 2 treatments.
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The two paired task categories would be the two risky versus two certain tasks (tasks ii and iii) as
well as the risky versus upside or downside (tasks v and vi); and then there is also the nocommunication versus communication treatment. Within each of the behavioral categories,
adjacent cells on the 2 x 2 matrix could be tested to see if the proportion of the population
exhibiting that behavior were similar or different. Did communication or the type of risk change
the behavior?
Hypothesis 3 has two parts: (3a) that the risky-dominated task iv) will be more selfinterested than the baseline-certain task i), and (3b) that task iv) will be more other-regarding
than the risky versus certain tasks ii) and iii). We will combine part 3b tasks ii) and iii) for
purposes of testing. See the results of the experiment in Table 11.

#
iv

$10
Risky Dominates
Versus
i
Certain
ii&iii Risky vs Certain

$5
Risky

Control
Treatment
Total
No Communication Communication Com & Cont
A
B
A
B
A
B
N
$10
$10 N $10 $10 N $10 $10
7
0.57
0.29 10 0.80 0.70 17 0.71 0.53

Certain
7
Total ii & iii 14

0.71
0.36

0.57
0.57

10 0.80
20 0.60

0.80 17 0.76 0.71
0.55 34 0.50 0.56

Table 11 Hypothesis 3 – Risky dominated task iv wiggle behavior versus task i, ii, and iii.
This table organizes the data for tests in Table 12. A $10 is the fraction of time the N experts
recommend the high $10 choice. B $10 is the fraction of time the choice of the N clients resulted
in the high $10 payoff. The total combines the communication treatment [Com] and the control
without communication [Cont].

The recommendations for the risky dominated task iv) and the pursuant choices tend to
be more self-interested than for the baseline certain task i), but the one-way t-test does not show
statistical significance, see first row of Table 12. Hypothesis 3a is rejected for lack of
significance. In the communication treatment, both tasks result in relatively high, 80%, other39

regarding recommendation, and no difference is observed. In the second row of Table 12, testing
Hypothesis 3b, when the risky dominated task iv) is compared to the two risky versus certain
tasks [ii) and iii)] the results are mixed in the direction of change and are not significant,
rejecting Hypothesis 3b. The risky dominated task iv) produces more other-regarding
recommendations, but the choice outcomes in the no communication control treatment move in
the opposite direction (possibly just due to the small sample size). In Table 12 for the
comparisons with task i), the one-way t-test is testing if the risky dominate task iv) is more selfinterested, for tasks ii) and iii) the one-way t-test is for iv) to be more other-regarding.
Control - No
Communication
Test More
Test More
A
B
Other-Regarding
Self-Interested
t-test t-test
i) $10 & $5 Certain vs. iv) risky dominated 0.306 0.158
iv) risky dominated vs. Total risky ii) & iii) 0.187 0.881

Treatment
Communication
A
B
t-test t-test
0.500 0.314
0.145 0.223

Total
Com & Cont
A
B
t-test t-test
0.354 0.152
0.084 0.577

Table 12 Hypothesis 3 – student t-test for risky dominated task iv versus task i, ii, and iii.
Statistical tests of the data in Table 11. t-test shows the one-sided student t-test statistics that the
iv) risky dominated task is more self-interested than the certain task i) and is more otherregarding than the risky task ii) and iii). The total combines the communication treatment [Com]
and the control without communication [Cont].

The limited evidence is mixed and cannot provide a statistical test for Hypothesis 3 with
this small sample.
Hypothesis 4 posits that upside and downside risk in task v) and vi) will provide
additional opportunity for experts to be more self-interested than the risky versus certain tasks ii)
and iii) or the certain task i). The data for this comparison are in Table 13.
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Control
No Communication
A
B
#
$10
$5
N
$10
$10
i
Certain
Certain
7
0.71
0.57
ii
Risky
Certain
7
0.43
0.57
iii
Certain
Risky
7
0.29
0.57
ii&iii Total
Risky
14
0.36
0.57
v
Risky
$30 Upside
7
0.86
0.86
vi
$0 Downside Risky
7
0.14
0.29
v&vi Total
Up/Down-side 14
0.50
0.57

Treatment
Communication
A
B
N $10 $10
10 0.80 0.80
10 0.40 0.30
10 0.80 0.80
20 0.60 0.55
10 1.00 0.50
10 0.40 0.50
20 0.70 0.50

Total
Com & Cont
A
B
N $10 $10
17 0.76 0.71
17 0.41 0.41
17 0.59 0.71
34 0.50 0.56
17 0.94 0.65
17 0.29 0.41
34 0.62 0.53

Table 13 Hypothesis 4 - upside and downside risk in task v) and vi) is more self-interested.
This table organizes the data for tests in Table 14. A $10 is the fraction of time the N experts
recommend the high $10 choice. B $10 is the fraction of time the N clients’ choice resulted in
the high $10 payoff. The total if combining both the communication treatment [Com] and the
control without communication [Cont].

The statistical analysis of any additional self-interested behavior for the upside and
downside risk of task v) and vi) is in Table 14. The recommendations are not consistent with this
hypothesis. In particular, experts are averse to recommending the extreme risk-loving task v)
where the $5 average payout has a lottery-like potential to pay $30, but otherwise pays little.
This aversion is heightened in the communication treatment. However, in particular for task v) in
the communication treatment, a consistent recommendation of the $10 option resulted in 50% of
the clients not selecting the $10 recommended option.
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Test More
Self-Interested
v Up & vi Downside
v $30 Upside
vi $0 Downside
v Up & vi Downside

Test More
Other-Regarding
vs. i Certain
vs, iii Risk-loving
vs. ii Risk-averse
vs. ii & iii Risky

Control
Treatment
Total
No
Communication Communication Com & Cont
A
B
A
B
A
B
t-test
t-test
t-test
t-test t-test t-test
0.187
0.500
0.288 0.061 0.152 0.118
0.985
0.865
0.925 0.088 0.993 0.362
0.135
0.158
0.500 0.806 0.244 0.500
0.768
0.500
0.740 0.380 0.832 0.406

Table 14 Hypothesis 4 – Test if upside and downside tasks v) and vi) are more self-interested.
Statistical tests of the data in Table 13. t-test shows the one-sided student t-test statistics that the
risky tasks, v) the $30 Upside and vi) the $0 Downside tasks, are more self-interested than the
certain task i) or risky tasks ii) and iii). The total combines the communication treatment [Com]
and the control without communication [Cont].

Hypothesis 5 proposes that communication will be used to enable selfish, self-interested
recommendations. We first follow the classical analysis of the change in recommendation
presented above in Table 6. The change in recommendations is in the wrong direction or
insignificant (task ii) so statistical analysis of this (Table 15) will not support the hypothesis. The
sample size is 7 for the control no-communication treatment and 10 for the communication
treatment. The smallest p value is 0.46, and we reject that communication encourages selfinterested recommendations.
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#
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi

$10
Certain
Risky
Certain
Dominates
Risky
$0 Down

$5
Certain
Certain
Risky
Risky
$30 Up
Risky

Control – No
Treatment
Difference
Increases
Communication Communication Com-Cont
Self-Interest
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
A
B
Fract. Fract. Fract. Fract. Advice Chose t-test Dec t-test
0.71
0.57
0.80
0.80
0.09 0.23 0.648 0.352 0.830
0.43
0.57
0.40
0.30
-0.03 -0.27 0.457 0.543 0.146
0.29
0.57
0.80
0.80
0.51 0.23 0.983 0.017 0.830
0.57
0.29
0.80
0.70
0.23 0.41 0.830 0.170 0.948
0.86
0.86
1.00
0.50
0.14 -0.36 0.878 0.122 0.073
0.14
0.29
0.40
0.50
0.26 0.21 0.860 0.140 0.796

Table 15 Hypothesis 5 – one-sided t-test communication increases self-interested behavior.
The table shows the data and tests of significance. Fraction [Fract.] in A is the fraction of time
the experts recommend the high $10 choice. Fraction in B is the fraction of time the clients’
choice resulted in the high $10 payoff.
The two Difference columns show the change in fraction attributable to communication
calculated as Communication - Control [denoted as Com – Cont].
The A t-test shows the one-sided student t-test statistics that the communication treatment
increases self-interested recommendations. The A Dec shows the converse, the one-sided student
t-test statistics that the communication treatment decreases self-interested recommendations. The
B t-test show the one-sided student t-test statistics that the communication treatment increases
self-interested (to the expert) choice outcomes.

Because some of the literature reports that communication and transparency improve the
outcome of transactions, we will test the converse of Hypothesis 5 that recommendations will
improve with communication (see the A Decrease [Dec] column in Table 15). Indeed, in the
risk-loving task iii) communication does significantly decrease self-interested recommendations
(p value of 0.017). In the risky dominated task iv), the $30 upside task v), and the $0 Downside
task vi), communications tend toward decreasing self-interested behavior, but none are
significant on their own.
This conclusion might be premature, when we examine the outcomes for the client, the
results are mixed, sometimes the outcomes are more other-regarding and other times the
outcomes are self-interested, also included in Table 15. Although not statistically significant,
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several task choice outcomes trend towards increases in self-interested outcomes; both task ii)
risk-averse and task v) $30 upside move towards self-interested outcomes. On the other hand,
several outcomes move towards other-regarding outcomes: i) certain, iii) risk-loving, and iv)
risky dominated are not significant but are moving in favor of the client.
Finally, we rearrange the data into combinations of the various tasks and will present: the
total of all tasks, the risk-averse tasks, the risk-loving task, the risky tasks, the risk-dominated
tasks, the low-risk task, and the highly-skewed upside and downside potential task. As before,
we reject the hypothesis that communication facilitates an increase in self-interested
recommendations. The total of all tasks shows that communication leads to a statistically
significant increase in other-regarding recommendations but only a statistically insignificant and
small increase in other-regarding choice outcomes. As task iii) with risk loving $10 certain
versus a risky $5 produces the largest increase in other-regarding behavior, the slices of data that
include task iii) yield more significance than the other groupings. In addition to the total bucket,
the risk-loving bucket of task iii) and task v) as well as the risky bucket with tasks ii), iii), v) and
vi) also show statistical significance, see Table 16.
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$10
All
Risk-averse
Risk Loving
Risky
Dominated
Risky 2 & 3
Up 5 & Down 6

$5
1-6
2&6
3&5
2356
1&4
2&3
5&6

Control – No
Treatment
Difference
Increase
Communication Communication Com-Cont Other-Regarding
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
A
B
Fract. Fract. Fract. Fract. Advice Chose t-test Dec t-test
0.50
0.52
0.70
0.60
0.62 0.57 0.979 0.021 0.775
0.29
0.43
0.40
0.40
0.35 0.41 0.746 0.254 0.436
0.57
0.71
0.90
0.65
0.76 0.68 0.987 0.013 0.352
0.43
0.57
0.65
0.53
0.56 0.54 0.973 0.027 0.321
0.64
0.43
0.80
0.75
0.74 0.62 0.839 0.161 0.970
0.36
0.57
0.60
0.55
0.50 0.56 0.913 0.087 0.453
0.50
0.57
0.70
0.50
0.62 0.53 0.875 0.125 0.346

Table 16 Hypothesis 5 – Grouping tasks – communication increases self-interested behavior.
The table shows the data and tests of significance. Fraction [Fract.] in A is the fraction of time
the experts recommend the high $10 choice. Fraction in B is the fraction of time the clients’
choice resulted in the high $10 payoff.
The two Difference columns show the change in fraction attributable to communication
calculated as Communication - Control [denoted as Com – Cont].
The A t-test shows the one-sided student t-test statistics that the communication treatment
increases self-interested recommendations. The A Dec shows the converse, the one-sided student
t-test statistics that the communication treatment decreases self-interested recommendations. The
B t-test shows the one-sided student t-test statistics that the communication treatment increases
self-interested choice outcomes.

As Hypothesis 5 failed, it does not make sense to test Hypothesis 6 that communication
will have less self-interested effect on the recommendations of the dominated tasks, the certain
task i) and risky dominated task iv). We can note along those lines that communication causes
the outcome choice for these two dominated tasks to be significantly more other-regarding (p
value 0.030). To the extent that this is less self-interested effect from the recommendation and
text communication, the spirit of this Hypothesis is there, even if we need to reject it.
Although both Hypotheses 4 and 5 fail, there is some interesting behavior to observe in
the communication treatment of task v) with $30 upside potential. When task v) with
communication is compared either to the same task without communication or to the risk loving
task iii) with communication, the recommendations move in one direction and the outcome
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choices move in the opposite direction. If this observation holds up under scrutiny with a larger
sample size, something quite interesting might be occurring.
The communication of the lottery situation in task v) was complex and most experts tried
in their communication in some way to convey the essence of this complex lottery having a large
chance of $30 upside but with low expected return of $5. However, half of the experts failed to
convince their clients. It is not clear if the complexity of explaining the payout in task v) caused
the experts to have difficulty convincing their clients, or if the experts took advantage of this
complexity to confuse their clients into not believing the advice. It is possible that
communication was used to preserve the propriety of recommending the other-regarding choice
while effecting a more self-interested outcome.
Hypothesis 4 posited that compared to risky task ii) and iii), the experts would hide the
impropriety of more self-interested recommendation behind the complexity in tasks v) and vi)
and gain a more self-interested outcome. But in the case of task v) with communication, it looks
like experts may have been able to gain a more self-interested outcome while making otherregarding recommendations and truthful but confusing communications. The experts obtained
this more self-interested outcome as we had proposed, but they did this without any personal cost
of risk to their propriety. They made no self-interested recommendations!
Similarly, when considering this same task v) under Hypothesis 5 where we postulated
that communication might be used to make self-interested recommendations, the
recommendations moved in the direction contrary to Hypothesis 5. But half the clients made a
choice opposite to the other-regarding recommendation, and the outcomes were in line with
Hypothesis 5. It is possible that in some situations, the expert takes advantage of the situation to
recommend the other-regarding choice but communicates this recommendation in a less than
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persuasive manner. The client gets confused, or becomes distrustful, and makes a choice
opposite to that recommended. Now the expert has higher “utility,” as they were able to preserve
their moral integrity by giving the other-regarding recommendation with a truthful
communication about the choice. Yet, they did so in a way that resulted in the client rejecting the
recommendation and selecting the expert's self-interested choice, as though they had in effect
done what Hypothesis 5 proposed and made the self-interested recommendation. In some of the
scenarios, the results support such a speculative narrative. But it would be hard to show such
intent of confusion. Until more data can be collected such notions remain speculative.
Probably the biggest takeaway from this treatment is that a consistent recommendation
with communication of the other-regarding choice was not sufficient to improve the outcome for
the clients. The client choices and the client outcomes deteriorated!
With regard to our six hypotheses, only the universally accepted Hypothesis 1, that some
experts under non probabilistic certain payments would make other-regarding recommendations,
was confirmed. The other hypotheses specific to this experiment had mixed results. With a larger
data set some tasks may exhibit the behaviors described in the hypotheses while other tasks may
not. There was a lot of heterogeneous behavior, and the behavior in the paired risk-averse and
risk-loving tasks may be different from each other. The experiment lacks enough data to observe
or test the portion of the experiment design with paired task to identify experts who made selfinterested recommendation that are contrary to consistent expectations about the client’s utility
preferences. But the limited data on hand does little to confirm such behavior. Instead, the
observations seem to be that experts behave differently when considering making
recommendations about risk-averse or risk-loving situations.
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1.7 Conclusion
We wanted to eexpand the literature on when experts switch from other-regarding
behavior to self-interested behavior. Our experiment tests if communication from the expert to
the client influences the expert’s behavior. The literature having observed expert switching to
self-interested actions under a plethora of mechanisms that only partially remove direct
culpability for the result, it seemed likely that experts would also use communication to further
their self-interested ends. This is a novel experimental in the other-regarding literature testing the
effects of communication. Compared to the dictator game, communication seems to be natural
component of the expert-advice client-choice game; so, this experiment was designed around
expert advice. The literature on dictator games is very robust compared to the relatively smaller
literature on expert advice in laboratory experiments. As communication had not been tested
before, and further as the distinct vocabulary used to describe various situations may result in
different behavioral responses, this experiment was designed trying to span a large spectrum of
situations to test if the diverse vocabulary or situations mattered. The results were varied across
the different task tested, though in many cases the responses were not necessarily what was
expected. The level of other-regarding recommendations was either flat or increased with the
treatments of communications. Thus, the central Hypothesis 5 that communication would
increase self-interested behavior was rejected; in some cases the opposite was statistically
significant.
Unfortunately, the circumstance of the ongoing COVID pandemic has made data
collection unusually challenging. Most of the Hypotheses specific to our experimental design
concerning risky outcomes as well as the effect of communication were inconclusive. Even so,
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there were sufficient data to confirm Hypothesis 1, the well-established other-regarding
recommendation behavior of experts when outcomes are clear.
In the case of task v) with $30 upside, the experts unanimously recommended the otherregarding option yet the communication as so unpersuasive that half the clients not follow their
advice. It is not clear if the choices in the task were simply too complicated to explain, or if the
communicated explanations of the other-regarding advice were meant to tempt and confuse.
Task vi) $0 downside task had a similar 50% following the advice and 50% rejecting the advice,
but only 40% of the recommendations were other-regarding. So, in task vi) bad advice was
rejected. With a small sample size it would not be possible to evaluate if the actual mostly
truthful communications were designed to elicit mistrust, but one should consider the possibility
of this strategy when evaluating whether communication was helpful in the case where it elicited
100% other-regarding recommendations. If we only evaluate the effect of communication on the
recommendation, then we would fail to consider the real effect of communication on the actual
welfare of the outcome chosen. It is indeed novel to entertain that other-regarding
recommendations with truthful communication might be contrary to the interest of the client.
Additionally, with a larger data set text analysis might be fruitful in illuminating different
communication type and how they were used in the various situations.
For the most part, results under Hypotheses 2-6 were at best mixed or in many cases
exhibited behavior contrary to the original hypotheses. This mostly statistically insignificant
evidence often suggested heterogeneous behavior under the different tasks. The data are at best
suggestive that additional data might reject this paper’s six hypotheses. The conclusions might be
that recommendation behavior is very specific to the outcome risk profile in each task.
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The tasks in this experiment were specifically designed to identify if experts might
consistently make self-interested recommendations in risk-averse and risk-loving situations. If
the experts would fail to maintain a consistent expectation about the utility risk preferences of
clients. Although there are not enough data for statistical analysis on the data parsed into such
specific behaviors, the heterogeneity of the data does not indicate that a very significant portion
of the population would be expected to exhibit this specific strong self-interested behavior.
On the contrary, the limited data indicate that experts may make very different
recommendations when the situation is risk-averse versus risk-loving. The two sets of paired
tasks ii) and iii) with risky versus certain outcomes, and v) and iv) where potential risky upside
and downside (i.e., more risky outcomes) resulted in nonuniform recommendation and choice
outcomes. Probably hypotheses that distinguish the behaviors in these paired tasks are more
likely to be significant. The experiment rejects that experts are unambiguously self-interested
when risky return is involved.
Instead, the results suggest that experts differ their behavior between the various risk
distributions in the tasks, though a larger sample size would be needed to test the specifics. The
risk-averse tasks tend to see more self-interested behavior than the risk-loving tasks. But it is
unlikely that any significant portion of the client population would actually have such extreme
utility risk profiles that they would prefer the $5 choice under any of these outcomes. The
experts may be using these unlikely assumptions as a ruse to feel personally more comfortable
about making the self-interested wiggle. The experts would be very misguided if they were in
good faith assumed their clients’ utility risk preferences were so extreme. This is not a genuine
assumption; this really could only be used to provide personal comfort through having a vaguely
plausible excuse to wiggle and to make the self-interested recommendation. It is interesting to
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note that in the risk loving case, experts avoid using the excuse of uncertainty to switch to the
self-interested advice. This distinction between risk-loving and risk-averse behavior was not one
of our hypotheses, thus in this small dataset we did not test it, but future experiments might
consider testing such a hypothesis.
In the case of recommendations without communication there is no way for the client to
know in what tasks they should believe or distrust the advice. The best indicator of any shift in
outcomes would be a shift in recommendations, and with a larger dataset choices should track in
the direction of recommendations. This experiment was designed to test theories about expert
recommendations. and not specifically to test client choice. With a larger dataset it might be
possible to construct a model of the strategies followed by clients, in the without communication
treatment this model would have to be constant across all 6 tasks. Some clients would follow the
advice while others would do the opposite and a third group would follow some mixed strategy
based on cheap-talk. Any model of this would inherently have to track the direction of shift in
expert advice. Thus, it is appropriate that our experiment was designed to focus on expert advice.
On the other hand, in the case of communication, the clients may be able to use the
communications to discern trustworthy and untrustworthy recommendations. The actual choice
behavior in the communications treatments may have some relevance in a larger sample size. At
a minimum one should be hesitant to make strong conclusions were advice and choices under
communication to diverges in a larger sample.
It may be premature to make any conclusions from this small a data set, but the data do
lean towards considering and testing new hypotheses that behavior might be responding to the
specific payment probability risk profile of each task. The data are strongly suggestive that a
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larger dataset will reject that communication increases self-interested advice and may well find
that in many situations communication increases other-regarding advice.
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CHAPTER 2
Expert Wiggle Room Under Ambiguity versus Uncertainty
When faced with a decision that affects the welfare of another, will a person make more
self-interested choices in ambiguous rather than uncertain situations as they can deliberately
focus their attention on the beliefs that support a self-interested action rather than considering
the full range of possible beliefs within the ambiguous information?

2.1 Abstract
Knowledgeable experts make decisions on behalf of uninformed clients even if their
knowledge might be incomplete. Knowing treatment effectiveness from a medical study, a
physician’s decision is made under uncertainty. Alternatively, not knowing treatment
effectiveness, the physician’s decision is made under ambiguity. In situations where the experts’
and clients’ interests are not aligned, the expert choice is between self-interested and otherregarding options. With ambiguous knowledge, the expert will make their decision based on the
range of possible situations. However, they might select to focus on the situations that justify
self-serving decisions even if the majority of the possible situations support an other-regarding
choice that is not favorable for themselves. In other dictator games experts are observed to take
advantage of any elements that might decouple their actions from direct culpability for the
other’s outcome, to make more self-interested choices. The question we examine with controlled
laboratory experiment dictator games is whether the choices made by experts under ambiguity
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are more self-interested than those made under uncertainty? Our results find behavior under
ambiguity and uncertainty indistinguishable.
2.2 Introduction and Motivation –Physicians and other examples of expert decisions
If faced with a decision that affects the welfare of another, will a person make more selfinterested choices in ambiguous6 rather than uncertain7 situations? The decision maker in the
ambiguous situations may be able to select to focus their attention only on the potential states of
the situation under the ambiguity that support their self-interested action rather than considering
the full range of possible beliefs within the ambiguous information that might in total support a
different other-regarding action that does not align with their own self-interests.

6

We are using the Ellsberg definition of ambiguity. An ambiguous decision or choice results in a
state where the probabilities of the outcomes are unknown. Ambiguity is present “where there
are questions of reliability and relevance of information, and particularly where there is
conflicting opinion” and thus judgement information and estimates “cannot be expressed in
terms of relative likelihoods or events (if it could, it would simply affect the final, compound
probabilities).” (Ellsberg, 1961 [17]) Thus we are excluding Camerer and Weber’s, 1992 [8],
Second-Order Probabilities, where all probabilities are known but are represented by two nested
stages, the first stage being the probabilities of each probability distribution being the current or
correct state, and the second stage being the probability distributions. This definition is
consistent with Knight’s, 1921 [36], definition of unmeasurable uncertainty where “numerical
probabilities were inapplicable - in situations when the decision-maker was ignorant of the
statistical frequencies of events relevant to his decision; or when a priori calculations were
impossible”; nested probabilities are excluded when all the probability information is known and
thus it is possible to calculate the probabilities. This ambiguity is similar to Keynes's, 1921 [35],
unknown probabilities, whatever the cause of the probabilities not being known.
7

For events with known or calculable probabilities, risk, or odds, we are using the umbrella term
uncertainty. This appears to be consistent with the formal use in the current experimental
economics literature (Salmon and Shniderman, 2019 [59]), though informal usage varies
substantially from this definition. Historically a long list of labels has been attached to this welldefined concept of “Bayesian” Subjective Utility and probabilistic knowledge of the situation
where Savage’s Axioms would be applicable. In particular Knight would call this “risk”, or
“measurable uncertainty” and Ellsberg call it “unambiguous”
gambles/risk/probabilities/likelihood.
54

In situations where we are not knowledgeable, we have all sought and relied on the
advice of experts. If we need medical care we go to our physician, if we need investment advice,
we ask a stockbroker, if we need our plumbing, air-conditioning, electricity, or car repaired, we
seek the advice of a service provider skilled in those repairs. Even owners of corporations use
company managers to make diverse frequent daily management decisions, and citizens allocate
running the country to expert government officials to make those decisions. Every new
technological advance in our economy sprouts new fields of experts to manufacture, use, and
service these innovations. There are innumerable daily situations where decisions are made by
expert service providers on behalf of uninformed clients.
We are using the Ellsberg definition of ambiguity of a state where the probabilities of the
outcomes are unknown, Ellsberg, 1961 [17]. We exclude nested probabilities and second-order
probabilities from our consideration of ambiguity; thus, we exclude Camerer and Weber’s, 1992
[8], second-order probabilities. Although they use different terminology, this definition is
consistent with Knight’s, 1921 [36], unmeasurable uncertainty and Keynes's, 1921 [35],
unknown probabilities. See footnote 6 for further discussion.
Even though there is a trust in experts, there is also a fear that the expert may take
advantage of the uninformed client. Did the mechanic or plumber really replace that part, or did
they just charge me for that part after doing a simpler repair? Could my air-conditioner have
been repaired or did the repair person make more money from installing a new air-conditioning
unit? We have all heard a litany of these doubts.
One specific example that has been carefully measured is physicians making the decision
between natural delivery and cesarean section. Physicians are observed to make self-interested
decisions that increase their own income at the expense of the wellbeing of the patient. The
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majority of cesarian sections performed in the US are not medically necessary. Presumably,
physicians make this choice as a cesarian section generally pays the physician and hospital about
twice as much as natural delivery. However, when unnecessary, C-sections slightly increase the
risks of complication or even death to mother and child. Further studies have shown that there is
the negative elasticity response to the comparable cost of cesarians and natural delivery. The
primary explanation of this negative elasticity to price is that the decision may be more about the
physician’s income than the health and welfare of the mother and baby.8
This paper studies the difference in the behavioral choices of the decision maker when
they have different types of information available to them about the choice they are making for
their client. We compare decisions made with uncertain information with decision made with
ambiguous information.
In well-documented but uncertain situations, the experts will know the probabilities of
the outcomes based on their decision choices. An example of this would be when a doctor has a

8

C-sections: Measuring the effectiveness of decisions within the actual health care process can
be quite complex or even impossible. Thus, we will be using a laboratory experiment. There is
one medical procedure that does lend itself well to investigation. It illustrates that the doctor’s
self-interested decision is contributing to cost significantly, indicating that our behavioral
experiment may be looking at the right type of decision to help reduce excessive Health Care
costs.
Given variation in demographic characteristic, it is expected that the medical lifesaving need for
C-sections in any population is between 10% and 15%, thus C-section rates above 15% can
generally be considered unnecessary. The 2010 C-section rate in the United States varied from
7% to 70% by hospital, averaging 33%. Physician compensation for C-sections is significantly
higher than for natural births. Not only are physicians performing unnecessary C-sections, but
C-sections also show a positive price elasticity of demand. The locations with greater additional
compensation to the doctor for a C-sections are the same locations with higher C-section rates.
This observation could be driven by the same behaviors we are investigating, whenever the
physician sees any uncertain or ambiguous signs such as a small anomaly, they are using this
anomaly to provide moral cover so they can choose to perform a C-section even if it is not
accurately necessary or in the client’s best interest. Gruber and Owings, 1996 [28].
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medical study comparing the relevant treatment outcomes for patients with similar conditions to
their own patient. The doctor could use the study’s results to choose for their patient the
treatment that had the highest chance of successful outcomes, even if no outcome were certain.
In less well-documented situations, the expert may only have some vague ambiguous
understanding of the range of probabilities that might be applicable to the various outcomes
given their choices. In such situations, the doctor might have no studies directly applicable to
their patient or might have multiple studies with conflicting information as far as what the best
treatment might be. In making the decision for their patient, the doctor would be making a
judgement call about what possible information from a range of possibilities might be most
relevant for this patient and their condition. It might be appropriate to use the treatment
recommended by the largest number of studies, or it might be appropriate to think that the one
outlying study with a different answer was more relevant for this situation. It is a judgement call,
neither answer is wrong, although it may be that most experts would expect the “average” or
middle answer to have more support. What we trying to examine is whether this judgement call
used in the decision process is inordinately focusing on the judgement that would most benefit
the decision maker’s outcome as a means to justify this self-interested choice, rather than
focusing on all the possibilities in an effort to find the choice that will benefit the client’s
outcome.
First, as observed throughout the literature in other similar experiments, we hypothesize
that we will observe experts making some other-regarding decisions where they do not choose
the self-interested choice. Second, the primary hypothesis we are testing is that decision makers
faced with ambiguity will make more self-interested choices than decision makers faced with
uncertain information. In both situations, the outcome is unknown; however, in ambiguous
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situations there is no way to identify a single “correct” choice with the highest expected client
utility. We hypothesize that decision makers will take advantage of this ambiguous opportunity
by focusing their attention on the possible information that results in justifying a self-interested
choice even if this possible information might be viewed as having less support. Thus, we expect
to observe more self-interested choices under ambiguity compared to more other-regarding
choices for decisions with uncertainty.
In the filed many of the decisions on behalf of others are made under ambiguity or
uncertainty. But in many of these ambiguous cases it might be possible to educate the expert
about existing knowledge or for more detailed research and studies to be performed thus turning
the expert advice under ambiguity into expert advice under uncertainty. Thus, with an investment
in education, a study or research, similar future decisions could be made with known
probabilities of outcomes and only face uncertainty but not ambiguity. With public policy and
intervention through investment in studies, it might be possible to improve some expert decisionmaking process so that the outcomes for their clients have a higher expected utility. Likewise, it
would also be possible for the decision maker to change an uncertain situation into ambiguous
decisions through deliberate ignorance (either as a beneficial policy if that was warranted or to
serve self-interest). As studying such decisions will have public policy implications across many
fields, a deeper understanding of the influences on the decision made on behalf of other is
important.
The difference between ambiguity and uncertainty is the extent of knowledge about the
probabilities of each outcome were that option selected; thus, in an experiment carefully
changing only one step at a time, it becomes natural to compare these two states in an attempt to
isolate what causes transitions between other-regarding and self-interested behavior.
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2.3 Literature Review
This paper examines the choice behavior of decision makers whose choices affect the
welfare of others. As is the case with much of the other-regarding literature we utilize laboratory
experiments with variations of the dictator game9. We examine a range of other-regarding
choices made where the outcomes are uncertain in that they are defined by probability, compared
to choices made where there is ambiguity about the outcome as there is only a range of possible
probabilities for the outcomes. Although historically these precise labels are not always used in
the literature, there have been multiple variations in the literature that test conditions of
uncertainty and a few that test ambiguity. These studies have observed both self-interested and
other-regarding choices in both situations with ambiguity and with uncertainty.10 We did not find
any papers that compared ambiguity and certainty directly, although Haisley and Weber, 2010
[29], comes close. We will examine a few of these examples below.
In designing our experiment, we modified the three-color Ellsberg Urn game to be an
other-regarding decision, Ellsberg, 1961 [17]. Previous three-color Ellsberg Urn game
experiments have observed ambiguity aversion when decisions were made in situations where
only their own outcomes were affected. In our discussion, we will also review the Ellsberg Urn

9

Throughout we use the terms dictator and dictator game to connote the role of the decision
maker in the classic psychology and economic dictator game used to test norms of fairness,
propriety and the fickle fleeting nature of other-regarding preferences that challenge more
classical assumptions of self-interest and maximization of personal profits. The dictator is given
an endowment of money to split between the dictator and the other passive participant, the
recipient. Sometimes dictator-experimental-subjects give some of the money to the recipient, but
less or more so in different variation of the game. The specific contextual framing and setup of
this dictator game has been found to influence the dictator's decisions significantly, and this has
led to the use of dictator games to study and try to isolate specific psychological-economic
causes that influence individuals to be more other-regarding or more self-interested.
10

Dana et al., 2007 [16]; Haisley and Weber, 2010 [29]; van der Weele Kulisa Kosfeld and
Friebel, 2010 [60]; Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2008 [38]; Karni Salmon & Sopher, 2008 [34].
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literature as it relates to our test that examines whether decision makers take advantage of the
wiggle room from ambiguity to focus more on the possibilities that justify self-interested
decisions.
Dictator games provide a classical laboratory experimental game where the decisions
made by subjects exhibit other-regarding preferences and people are clearly not just making
decisions to maximize their own wealth. Utilizing various treatments and other variations, the
literature has used dictator games to study people’s preferences concerning others.
Two of the early papers to start untangling the motives behind the observed otherregarding preference in the dictator game were Dana Cain Dawes (Dana et al., 2006) [15] and
Dana Weber and Kuang (Dana et al., 2007) [16]. They investigated several treatment variations of the
dictator game and were able to observe differences in choices in the dictator game by changing small
aspects framing the choice but keeping core choice about how much to share. The baseline dictator game,
where all parties have full knowledge and the outcomes are deterministic (not probabilistic) based on the
dictator’s actions, resulted in about 75% other-regarding choices. Whereas in various uncertain framings
that obscured direct culpability this opacity provided moral “wiggle room” for almost half of these
subjects, who were other-regarding under transparency, to become self-interested. The dictator game was
creating a situation where many subjects felt situationally obliged to share; thereby they frequently
exhibited other-regarding or sharing behavior. However, if the dictator’s actions could be construed as not
directly causing the bad results for the other subject, then the dictators felt much less obligation to make
other-regarding choices. Subjects even avoided costless effort that would have allowed them to make
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other-regarding choices efficiently; dictators avoided learning which option was the other-regarding choice
and instead through elected ignorance chose the self-interested option.11 .
Dictator game experiments have continued to build on these discoveries, investigating
how the dictator’s other-regarding actions were sensitive to variations in the framing. Below is a summary
of some of the literature focused on various treatments that caused subjects to switch between giving more
frequently in one situational frame to choosing more self-interest actions in a different frame. Experiments
by a multitude of authors used a wide variety of wiggle room mechanisms. This switching was evident in
frames that utilized ambiguity, uncertainty, ignorance, delegation, exit, and expanded choice sets among
others when the situation changed to allow for or exclude possible wiggle room beliefs that could preserve
the appearance that the decision markers choices-maintained propriety and did not violate consideration of
other-regarding concern. Following is a review of some of this literature concentrating on variation of
ambiguity and uncertainty even when these terms were not explicitly used.
Although some papers use the term ambiguity loosely there are no papers we could find where the
device used in the dictator game conforms specifically to our formal Ellsberg-Knight definition of
ambiguity as an unknown probability or range of probabilities (or incalculable probability) where through
the design of the experiment the subjects in the experiment are not informed about the probabilities or
distribution of probabilities inherent to the devices design. We did find several situations where decisions
were delegated or shared with another human; although the behavior of the other human was “unknown”,
it is more likely that such human interactions are best viewed as a strategic solution to a game-theory
problem rather than as an unknown ambiguous device.

11

Dana et al., 2007 [16]; Grossman, 2014 [26]; Grossman and van der Weele, 2015 [27].
61

The paper that comes closest to examining ambiguity is Haisley and Weber, 2010 [29], where
they compared uncertainty to a treatment labeled “ambiguity”. The uncertain treatment has a 50%
probability of paying the recipient when the dictator chose the self-interested option; the other-regarding
choice is deterministic paying 100% of the time. The “ambiguity” treatment is a double lottery first
randomly drawing the probability, then drawing the outcome – there is still a 50% chance of payment. The
dictator makes fewer other-regarding choices in the “ambiguity” double lottery treatment than in the
uncertain less complex single lottery. However, the “ambiguity” treatment does not meet the EllsbergKnight definition of ambiguity since the treatment in is a second-order probability – a double lottery – a
more complex but still computable probabilistic outcome with the same payoff.12 It is still easy to calculate
all probabilities and thus in both the uncertain and double uncertain treatments the dictator would have no
ambiguity about the expectation of the value of the recipient's benefits. There is no ambiguity about the
belief the dictator should hold about the expectation of the payments for the recipient.13

12

See Footnotes 6 and 7 for the Ellsberg-Knight definitions used in this paper for ambiguity and
uncertainty.
Haisley and Weber, 2010 [29]. In the treatment labeled “ambiguity” the first lottery with equal
probabilities of drawing a number between 0 and 20 for the number of red chips, the remainder
of the 20 chips being blue; the second lottery is an equal-probability draw from the bag of 20
chips to see if the draw matches the color chosen by the dictator. The resulting 50% chance of
payment does not meet our definition of ambiguity.
13

Another problem with Haisley and Weber, 2010 [29], is that it fails to control the game design
symmetrically in that the self-interested choice is always the same choice as the lottery and
double lottery. Thus, if there is a preference for lotteries or for double lotteries this is
indistinguishable from a self-interested preference. The experiment also includes a treatment
with “education” about double lotteries. The observed response to this education treatment is
indistinguishable between education that changed the dictator’s preference for double lotteries
versus education that changed use of wiggle room and other-regarding preference. There would
need to be a symmetrical game that switches the alignment of the self-interested and otherregarding choices so that the self-interested choice is separated from the lottery and double
lottery. This would facilitate distinguishing between actions facilitated by wiggle room being
used to increase self-interested choices preferences from action motivated by preference about
lotteries and double lotteries.
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They are able to ameliorate some of this double lottery wiggle by having the subject play a selfinterested single (uncertain) or double (“ambiguous”) probability-uncertainty lottery prior to playing the
dictator game. The subsequent dictator game shows reduced self-interested wiggle in situations with
similar double uncertainty (“ambiguous”) payment to others. These treated double-lottery games are
indistinguishable from the single uncertainty payments to others with or without the treatment of the selfinterested game.
There are two papers where the decision is delegated to another human, thus resulting in outcomes
of unknown probability, but these other humans should probably be viewed as a strategic solution
removing culpability. Dana et al., 2007 [16] uses the ambiguity of a second human in a multiple-dictator
treatment where only when both chose the self-interested option is that payout implemented, otherwise the
other-regarding outcome is paid. The frequency of the self-interested choices when made by the other
human is between the frequency of the two-uncertainty treatment; however, as the treatments are not
designed to be similar to each other, this might be an artifact of the different framing. The other paper
Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012 [4], focuses on blame and punishment; some treatments without
punishment used the delegation to another human as an ambiguous device motivated by the other human’s
unknown behavior. It seems that to avoid a perceived obligation to make the other-regarding choice, some
dictators instead delegate to this second human thereby increasing the chance of a self-interested results.
Uncertain outcomes have known probabilities of occurring, and the outcome is determined by a
computer, coin, or other probability device. The dictators have a direct choice to invoke a probability
mechanism, or an indirect way such as by choosing to act slowly. The outcome is a state with known
probabilities of each different outcome. Dana et al., 2007 [16], has an uncertain treatment where slow
action results in a random choice by the computer. Some subjects are still other-regarding even though
many used the information veil of social deniability to make self-interested choices directly. The central
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treatment is that through inaction, a probability device will make some self-interested choice without the
dictator suffering a blow to their own self-image as they do not need to make the selfish choice directly.
This treatment results in more other-regarding behavior than the ambiguous shared-with-another-human
decision, but it is probably not significant, nor are the game decision trees or actions very comparable.
Similar to the slow choice in Dana et al., 2007 [16], van der Weele Kulisa Kosfeld and Friebel,
2010 [60] played reciprocity games with a slow choice action resulting in random choice treatment. They
“conclude that reciprocity is a more stable disposition than dictator game generosity” as there is no
discernable reciprocity wiggle. The social interaction of giving combined with the option for reciprocity to
return the favor by giving back has created a social expectation that is not disrupted by the option to blame
the computer’s choice for failing to be reciprocal.
The two other papers with uncertainty are Haisley and Weber, 2010 [29], as discussed above that
includes both uncertainty and double uncertainty and Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2008 [38]. The latter places
subjects in two probabilistic-uncertain treatments with the allocation of 10 tokens between self and other
where subjects are sometimes other-regarding.
Uncertainty through strategic ignorance and hidden information is used in assorted settings to
preserve an uncertain situation where there are defined probabilities for various outcomes or states;
whereas a costless action could be taken prior to making the decision that would reveal the actual
conditions and thus remove the uncertainty. In Dana et al., 2007 [16] however, some participants avoid
costless action to become informed and use ignorance wiggle to make self-interested action, and some
participants make other-regarding choices. Grossman, 2014 [26], modifies this hidden-information
treatment to test treatments with 1) a hidden-information default 2) active choice required 3) reveal default.
All treatments exhibit other-regarding action with active choice and default reveal having significantly
more other-regarding behavior than hidden default. Actions required or not required to maintain
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uncertainty under strategic ignorance matter. Larson and Capra, 2009 [41], run double blind experiments
building on Dana et al., 2007 [16], hidden uncertain-information experiments, some dictators based on
their own moral self-image still take other-regarding actions.
In Feiler, 2014 [18], ignorance maintains uncertainty with varying degrees of aligned and
misaligned interests; some participants are other-regarding, other participant’s use ignorance for wiggle to
self-interested action, where distribution of choices varies by conditions. Matthey and Regner, 2011 [43],
use additional payment rewards and probabilities in the hidden uncertain-information dictator game, and
some subjects continue to take other-regarding actions.
Grossman and van der Weele, 2015 [27], use uncertain hidden-information dictator games where
some subjects in each variant will take other-regarding actions, revealing the state of the game to select the
other-regarding choice. These subjects also exhibit more pro-social scores on the experiment's behavioral
test. Meanwhile, other subjects opt to be informed only after making their self-interested decision under
uncertainty. Further, some are even willing to pay for ignorance and the preservation of uncertainty, so
they do not feel compelled to make the other-regarding choice.
Models of behavior and experiments in both the psychology of lying and the economics
of lying describe three exhibited behaviors a) Truthful, b) Profit Maximizing – full lying, and c)
Strategic Lying to increase profit but in a way that maintains some veil of respectability and
morals in the opinions of both self and other. Both wiggle room and strategic lying benefit from
added self-serving action while maintaining some appearance of respectability in that the
decision maker is able to point out that they did not take the worst choice – being that a selfinterested choice or a full lie. It should be noted that these lying and dictator game experiments
while looking for strategic lying and wiggle room also continue to observe some subjects who
are truthful-generous and some who are untruthful-profit-maximizing. There are similar
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“acceptable” but constrained moral lapses in obscured-causality wiggle room and in the
dishonesty-lying of partial lies where for limited gains subjects make small stretches of the truth.
Subjects will avoid full lies for maximum gain as they avoid violating propriety, but partial lies
seem tolerable. Slightly stretching the truth appears acceptable as it is taking advantage of
opaque or indirect culpability wiggle room.14
Even though we are testing a completely different behavior, we must also attribute
inspiration for our experiment’s ambiguity design to an Ellsberg Urn design previously used to
show the Ellsberg paradox of ambiguity aversion, Ellsberg, 1961 [17]. We utilized the urn design
to model both probability and ambiguity. The Ellsberg paradox examines and finds ambiguity
aversion in games with one player.15 Although we utilize a similar ambiguity design of drawingcolored balls from an urn in our experiment, the hypothesis we test is that ambiguity is utilized to
make self-interested choices when ambiguity obscures culpability. Our experiment is designed so
that ambiguity aversion can be distinguished from self-interested actions. In some treatments the
self-interested choices have ambiguous payments to the other, in other treatments the other-

14

Mazar et al., 2008 [44] show in six experiments designed to test mechanisms that increase
morals in a task that often-induced partial lies where self-reported numbers of correctly
completed task were slightly exaggerated but participants were not claiming the full lie of all
tasks completed correctly. Reminding participants of morality or signing an honor code reduced
partial lie cheating. Participants knew they were lying as they were able to accurately predict
their performance on a no-cheating task after having just reported higher results on the same task
where cheating was possible. This small-exaggeration lying did not change when told the
average performance was much higher than the subject own performance, nor did the level of
cheating respond to changes in monitoring levels that varied the chance of being caught. There
was a slightly higher level of cheating when the process was more complex or indirect – when
participants were first paid in chips rather than directly in cash, and then exchanged the chips for
cash.
15

It is possible that our experiment is one of the first to be able to observe other-regarding
ambiguity aversion, when the decision maker is financially indifferent, although this behavior is
not directly related to the elements of wiggle room that are of interest in this study.
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regarding choice has ambiguous payments. For a comprehensive review of Ellsberg Urn
experiments and ambiguity aversion, see Camerer and Weber, 1992 [8].16
Finally, there are innumerable popular jokes and stories exemplifying the good and bad
behavior by auto mechanics, plumbers, electricians, stockbrokers, salesclerks, and doctors that could fill
several encyclopedias, years of standup routines, and countless personal advice columns The decisions of
experts are a concern of popular culture as well as of academic studies motivated to solve
concerns that affect outcomes in society. For example, Jacobsen et.al., 2011 [7] explored the
other-regarding behavioral traits of nursing students entering the health care profession
compared to students studying to become real-estate brokers. Even though our stereotypes of
these two professions are quite different, both sets of humans exhibited a distribution across
similar behavior types. Nevertheless, in line with our stereotypes, the distribution of otherregarding and self-interested behaviors was different in the two professions. Health care
professionals (nursing students) were significantly more generous in the baseline dictator game,
but also exited the game with higher frequency. Both groups exhibited this self-interested wiggle exit in
different proportion, but still confirmed that generosity is not driven by a welfare-regarding concern but is
more a form of social expectation.
Thus, even though health care professionals are exactly the type of expert one would
want making decisions for patients, it is also clear that it is important to understand and control
the framing of the interactions with the patient so as to preserve as much other-regarding
behavior as possible and to avoid framings that result in an increase in self-interested choices.

16

Fox and Tversky (1995) [21] explore the limitations of ambiguity aversion framing.
Ambiguity aversion is displayed as a presence for less ambiguous clearer situation, in isolation
without a comparative option the aversion and utility discount of ambiguity disappears.
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We need a better understanding of expert other-regarding decisions so that public policy could foster
other-regarding expert services.
2.4 Experimental Design
A total of 66 Southern Methodist University undergraduate students from various
departments were recruited for an experiment. Each student participated in one of 5 experiment
sessions that were run with between 8 and 18 students and lasted about an hour and a half each.
Students were seated with privacy screens separating their computer terminals. As the
instructions were read out loud, students participated in three practice periods as examples of the
computer interface and the format of the questions they would be answering during the session.
There were two types of participants: Type A participants would make decisions that affected the
outcome for both paired participants, whereas Type B participants would answer questions about
the situation that did not affect the outcome.17 After the practice periods subjects were
permanently assigned to one of the two participant types. In the practice periods, subjects
answered the questions and saw the screens and the results for both participant types A and B,
and thus they were familiar with what the other participant type would see and know in addition
to their own screens. In each of the 34 periods Type A and Type B participants were randomly
paired for that period and would be randomly paired with other participants in the other
periods.18

17

Participant B was paid $5 for answering these questions, this amount is included in the
expected payments to participant B in Figure 1.
18

See note 7, the first two sessions had 2 sets of 15 periods for a total of 30 periods, later
sessions had 2 sets of 17 periods for a total of 34 periods.
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In each period, the Type A participants made a decision involving a virtual bag
containing many balls of three different colors. One ball would be randomly drawn from the bag
with each ball having equal probability. Before a ball was drawn by the computer, type A
participants chose between two of the three colors displayed on their computer screens (they
could choose the center or right color but not the left color), which determined payments for the
matched pair of dictator and recipient participants in that period. If the color chosen by A
matched the randomly drawn ball, then B’s payment for that period was 30 Experiment Currency
Units [ECUs]; if the colors did not match B received no payment.
There were two different information treatments (uncertain and ambiguous) and within
those treatments there were 17 different payment and ball configurations see Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Example of 17 Different Scenarios tested of Bag-Ball-Color-Pay.
The second row gives the expected payments to participant B when participant A choses the
center or the right ball color. The columns show the payment options to participant A in each of
the 17 scenarios.

The 17 configurations are used to elicit the subject’s preferences over a broad range of
situations.19 Figure 1 shows the configuration with 15 balls; the 30 ball and 45 ball

19

In the first two experimental sessions, the experiment only asked 15 different question
configurations. Some participants did not exhibit strong preferences when incentives were small.
Therefore, the later sessions were expanded to include two more questions with larger incentives.
Using the scenario numbers in Figure 1, some participants did not change their choice between
scenarios #7 and #9, thus scenarios #10 and #11 with larger incentives were added so that
switching behaviors might be observed. The rest of the text will refer to 17 configurations of
questions for both treatments for a total of 34 questions, it being understood that for the first two
experimental sessions there were only 15 configurations for both treatments for a total of 30
questions.
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configurations are a direct scaling of the 15-ball configuration keeping the color ratios constant
so that probabilities for each color remained the same in each of the three scaled variations. To
eliminate possible biases for each participant, the order of the questions was randomized, the
colors were randomized, and the total number of balls in the configuration of the bag was
randomized. The 6 standard primary and secondary colors were used, and in each period the bag
contained balls with 3 of these colors.20
Figure 1 shows the three types of ball configurations participant A saw in this
experiment:
i)

More left color balls with 7 left, 3 center and 5 right color balls,

ii)

Equal probability with 5 balls of each color, and

iii)

More center color balls with 3 left, 7 center and 5 right color balls.

Both type A and type B participants knew and saw on their screen that the right most
color is one third of the total balls. Participant A had more, but possibly not complete,
information about the number of center and left color balls when making their choice, this
information varied from period to period based on the information treatment that was being
tested. Even if A knew the exact ball configuration, A would still not know which ball would be
randomly drawn. Participant B did not have any other information except the names of the left
and center colors. When the participant does not know the exact information about a ball, it was
displayed with the ball’s two different potential colors, see Figure 2. In addition to graphically

20

Figure 1 and the other Figures use white grey and black due to printing constraints
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displaying the ball configuration in each period there was also a text description of the
configuration.

Figure 2 Example of how a ball that could be white or black was displayed

Participant B is the unknowledgeable client. Thus, B would not be able to identify or
compare probability or their probability-based preference between the expert’s choice of the
center or rightward color. In configuration ii) if Participant B were knowledgeable of the ball
configuration, they would be indifferent between the choices; both the center and right color
choice had an expected payoff of $15 [5 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠 ÷ 15 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠 × $30 + $5]21. However, in
configuration i) B's preference would be the center choice as the expected payoff was $19 [7 ÷
15 × $30 + $5], whereas the rightward color’s expected payoff was only $15 [5 ÷ 15 × $30 +
$5]. In configuration iii) B's preference would be the rightward color choice as the expected
payoff was $15 [5 ÷ 15 × $30 + $5], whereas the center color’s expected payoff was only
$11 [3 ÷ 15 × $30 + $5].
The experiment is designed to test all three ball configurations with a range of payments
for participant A. Participant A knew their own potential earnings that were determined solely by
the color they choose, independent of the random ball selection and participant B’s payment. The

21

In addition to the potential to have a $30 payoff if the balls matched or $0 if they did not,
participant B was paid $5 for answering questions each period that was related to the game play
but did not affect the game play. This $5 was included in the calculation of participant B’s total
expected pay to make it comparable to the decision maker’s (participant A) payment for their
choice.
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center color always paid participant A 15 ECUs, and the rightmost color paid an amount between
11 and 19 ECUs as displayed on their screen. So that behaviors could be observed across
different financial inducements, participant A made choices for all types of conditions: a larger
payment for choosing the center color, a larger payment for the rightward color, or also
indifference when there were two equal inducement choices. When both participants favored the
same choice, presumably there would be a tendency to choose this color. In Scenario # 12 in
Figure 1 both participants would benefit more from the center choice. Participant A is paid $15
which is more than $14, and participant B has a 7/15 chance to receive the larger $35 payment
which is larger than the rightward choice with 5/15 chance of the larger payment. Thus, in
Scenario # 12 the center choice should be the predominant choice.
When a participant's welfare was indifferent between two choices, presumably the other
factors of the decision problem would influence their choice. When the two participants’
payment interest were diametrically opposed, we tested a range of payment amounts to the
participant A in order to test the behavioral strength of participant A’s tradeoff between their
own interest and the interest of the other participant, participant B. In Scenarios 14-17, the
decision of participant A was tested progressively with an additional $1 incentive in each
subsequent scenario for choosing the rightward self-interested choice at the expense of the
alternative center other-interested choice; the question was how much additional self-interested
pay is needed to cause participant A to not pick the center other-interested choice.
In this paper we test two different levels of information available to participant A, the
decision maker, when determining their choice for both participants. The uncertain treatment
with defined probabilities is where participant A has complete information about the
configuration of the balls in the bag. This is similar to an expert practicing their profession fully
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knowing everything there is to know about the choice being made and the probabilities of
success of each alternative.
The ambiguous information treatment configuration is where participant A has
ambiguous information about multiple possible states of the problem. Participant A is uncertain
about the actual state of the problem as there is a range of possible states that describe the
conditions, but there is no knowledge or known probability about which of these states might be
the actual configuration of the problem. As probabilities are undefined, they could be skewed in
either direction; however, when drawing balls in the ambiguous cases, we use the same
probabilities as in the corresponding uncertain cases. This distribution is consistent and
indistinguishable from any distribution with the same mean such as any symmetric distribution
about the mean (uniform, normal-Gaussian, symmetric triangle, symmetric binomial, etc.).
Under the ambiguity treatment of ball configurations i), ii) and iii), both participants
continue to know that there are 5 balls of the right-most color. In the equal configuration ii),
participant A knows there are at least 3 balls of the left color and at least 3 balls of the center
color, while the remaining 4 balls could be either the left or center color but no further
information about these 4 balls is known. In the more left configuration i), participant A knows
there are at least 5 balls of the left color and at least 1 ball of the center color, but the remaining 4
balls could be either of those two colors [see the Scenarios 18-21 of Figure 4 for an example of
how this looked on the participant A’s screen]. In configuration iii), the state of the left and
center colors is the reverse of configuration i) [see the Scenarios 31-34 of Figure 4 for an
example of how this looked on the participant A’s screen]. The ambiguous treatment is designed
to reduce the direct culpability between participant A’s choice and the outcome to participant B.
As there is a range of possible bag-ball-color configurations, each possible configuration, were it
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individually true, might in participant A’s reasoning justify different decisions; thus, a range of
decisions might be viewed as reasonable. The information could be used by participant A to
support a variety of different beliefs about the actual state of the ambiguous problems. All
ambiguous cases include 5 possible configuration states; one of the possible states is always the
one where participant B’s payments could be from the equal treatment where B would be
indifferent to the choices made by A. However, given that there are also 4 other possible
configuration states, the presumption that B is indifferent may not be a strongly supported belief,
as the support for other assumptions is more robust and includes any assumption where any of
the four non-indifferent states is given more than zero weight.
The scenarios have been carefully constructed so that we test both combinations:
ambiguity combined with self-interested choices configuration i) Scenarios 18-21 of Figure 4,
and ambiguity combined with other-regarding choices configuration iii) Scenarios 31-34 of
Figure 4. This enables us to differentiate between behavior that is some preference or avoidance
of ambiguity versus behavior that is related to self-interested and other-regarding preferences.
Each period after A’s color choice, the computer randomly draws a ball from that
period’s bag-ball-color configuration, and the results and potential payment are displayed for
both paired participants to see. If there was any learning effect from seeing these results, this has
been controlled for by having all participants answer the questions in different random orders.
After making choices for all 17 payments and ball configurations in both of the two information
states for all 34 periods, a single period for all participants was randomly selected to determine
everyone’s actual final earnings.22

22

See note 5, the first two sessions had 2 sets of 15 periods for a total of 30 periods, later
sessions had 2 sets of 17 periods for a total of 34 periods. Note that everyone’s order was
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After the decision game scenarios, the subjects were given 5 minutes to answer 14
questions designed to test numeracy and cognitive abilities; participants received 50 cents for
each correct answer. Subsequently the participants were paid for both activities. The participants
received a $10 show-up fee, payment based on their test score, and as described above one of the
potential payment periods was randomly selected for payment. The subjects’ average total
earnings were about $30 for about an hour and a half of participation.
This expert decision game was designed to emulate the general conditions characteristic
of knowledgeable experts in the field making decision on behalf of their clients. The experiment
as designed focused on events that pay or do not pay such as the successful repair of an object or
the curing of a patient, but this model could also be adjusted to study tradeoffs between
outcomes with smaller differences. The model further has the feature that the outcomes are
determined by random probability, this will be similar to most expert service decisions as few if
any such services have 100% success rate. Thus, both in the experiment and in services observed
in the field, even when the expert acts in good faith with the best intentions for the client’s
outcome, sometimes the repair, cure, or stock performance are elusive even for other-regarding
experts.
2.5 Theory and Hypotheses
Our paper examines individuals' choices that concern both their own welfare as well as
the welfare of another. The central premise is that the decisions made will be more self-interested
when the outcome for the other participant are described ambiguously compared to similar
decisions made when the other participants outcomes are uncertain. In an ambiguous situation

different, as they were randomly determined, thus each participant pair in the payment period
would likely be paid for different configurations than the other pairs in the payment period.
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there are fewer constraints; the expert is able to justify a self-interested choice by ignoring any
ambiguous possibilities where the other participant’s interests are not aligned with their own.
Thus, the expert could maintain a belief that justifies their self-interested decision as also being
an other-regarding decision.
As previously explained, the choices we present involve one individual making a choice
that has a deterministic impact on their own welfare and a known probabilistic-uncertain or an
ambiguous unknown-probability impact on someone else's welfare. In every decision made,
participant A can look at the compensation to identify what is in his or her own interest. In a
decision involving uncertainty with known probabilities, participant A can also easily calculated
the relative expected values of each choice thus identifying the decision that is in the best interest
of the other person.
This experiment is designed to measure how much welfare the participants A will give up
in order to help the participants B by choosing the option that generates the highest expected
value for participant B. In the most extreme case in this experiment, it would involve participant
A sacrificing $4 to increase participant B’s expected benefit by $4. Few decision makers can be
expected to give up that much. On the other end participant A even gains money, $1, to make the
decision granting participant B an increase of $4 in expected benefit. For a gain, any rational
participant A should make the choice that helps both themselves and participant B. Even in the
case involving no sacrifice or gain where the payments to participant A are the same, it is
plausible to think that A will help out the B participant at no cost to themselves. Presented in a
random order the various scenarios test participant A’s choice given these personal options: gain
of $1, neither gain nor sacrifice, and sacrifices of $1, $2, $3, and $4 to generate a $4 increase in
participant B’s expected benefit.
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The question is if the participant A players will be willing to generate an increase of $4 to
the expected benefit for participant B even at some, perhaps small cost, to themselves. The prior
literature provides consistent evidence that when facing other-regarding decisions involving
uncertainty some people will give up some of their own welfare on behalf of others, and this
leads to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Some decision makers under uncertainty will be willing to make otherregarding choices; the frequency of other-regarding choice is greater than zero.
This measures if participant A in the uncertain treatments makes the choice that benefits
participant B even where it is costly to A. These costly other-regarding decisions will not
determine the motivation behind the decisions.
Assuming that this hypothesis holds, it then leads to a second question, what will
motivate dictators to switch to being self-interested? The decision maker can use an element as
justification that they “believed” that the other participant would not be directly harmed by their
own action, preserving the propriety of the dictator.23

23

The literature contains many papers where participants take advantage of costless strategic
ignorance to make a self-interested choice (Dana et al., 2007 [16]; Feiler, 2014 [18]; Grossman,
2014 [26]; Larson and Capra, 2009 [41]; Matthey and Regner, 2011 [43]; Nyborg, 2011 [49]);
some participants are even willing to pay for their own self-interested strategic ignorance rather
than know the other-regarding consequences (Cain and Dana, 2012 [7]; Grossman and van der
Weele, 2015 [27]). Participants readily share or delegate the decision making with others so as to
distance themselves from culpability for the self-interested choices they desire to be made (Dana
et al., 2007 [14]; Hamman, 2010 [30]; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2011 [4]; Coffman, 2011 [9]).
Participants are so averse to making self-interested decisions that some are willing to pay to exit
the game rather than make the dictator game choice (Dana et al., 2006 [15]; Jacobsen et al, 2011
[32]). Note in the last case that a Pareto improvement over this exit choice would be to not exit
so as to keep everything in the dictator game or choose to give the exit cost to the recipient.
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One possible source of such self-justification not fully explored or isolated in the prior
literature is ambiguity. In a choice involving ambiguity, a decision maker doesn’t know with
certainty which option would help the other person. They are free to form a belief focused on the
situations where both participants' interest are aligned justifying their self-interested choice
ignoring or discounting the situations where the other-regarding choices would not further their
own self-interests, consistent with the prior literature on other wiggle room mechanisms. This
leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Participant A’s frequency of other-regarding choices in the ambiguity
treatment will be smaller than in the uncertainty treatment.
We are beginning to distinguish the source of the tradeoff between other-regarding and
self-interested choices, differentiating behavior in uncertain situations from behavior in
ambiguous situations.
The experiment is further designed to distinguish between choices made based on views
and beliefs about ambiguity as opposed to choices based on the interplay of self- and otherregarding interests. We wish to determine the decision maker’s motivation behind any switches
between other-regarding and self-interested decisions. In the classical Ellsberg paradox, there
were no other-regarding payments, no decisions or tradeoff between self and other-regarding
interests. In the Ellsberg paradox, participants have consistent bias beliefs about ambiguity where
they are willing to give up some of their own potential income in order to avoid the ambiguous
alternative. Here we are trying to observe the use of ambiguity as a device to facilitate selfinterested behavior and distinguish this type of behavior from consistent bias about ambiguity.
Will decision makers pass pliable inconsistent relative judgements without foundation about the
outcomes under ambiguity, switching their beliefs about ambiguity in different situations so that
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beliefs align with their decision preference in the direction of the self-interested choices?
Alternatively, their decisions could be consistently aligned towards or away from the ambiguous
choices. Our observations will test for and distinguish motivations based on Ellsberg paradox
style consistent ambiguity bias versus motivations based on following their self-interested
interests.
Hypothesis 3: Participant A decision maker's frequency of being other-regarding will be
consistent independent of the direction of the ambiguity treatment.
Further along this line of investigation we want to control for any directional bias there
may be in other aspects of our experiment design and account for or remove any artifact this may
generate in our analysis of the ambiguity results. We have tried to make these directional biases
as innocuous as possible so as to minimize any possible directional bias, but they may still have
some influence. As in other experiments, our game design has a few directional features: 1) the
rightward choice is known to all to always have 1/3 of the balls (a known probability of payment
to the other participant), the number of balls in the centerward choice may be known to the
decision maker but is always unknown to the other participant; 2) both participants know the
payoff to the decision maker for the center choice is $15, but only the decision maker knows
their own payoff for the rightward choice. There may be some directional bias in participant A’s
decisions based on participant B’s knowledge of participant A’s payoff probabilities or
participant A’s compensation. Further some graphical elements may also present potential bias,
although we are trying to control for this by randomizing the color presentation and randomizing
the total number of balls in the urn.
Our hypothesis is that there is no directional bias, but what is important is to be aware of
the magnitude of any potential directional bias in the uncertain treatments when examining the
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results of the ambiguous treatments. There are several paired combinations that cross-test for
directional bias. The first will be to test if there is any directional bias in our base uncertain
treatment. Next will be to separate Hypothesis 2 of the move towards self-interest in the
ambiguity treatment compared to the uncertainty treatments into two separate tests: i) the first
where the other-regarding choice is rightward and ii) the second where the other-regarding
choice is centerward. Here we are trying to distinguish if any situational directional bias is
responsible for the uncertain versus ambiguity results or if the behavioral decisions are
responding to the switch between the uncertain and ambiguous treatments.
Hypothesis 4: Participant A's frequency of other-regarding decisions will be consistent
independent of the direction in the uncertain treatment.
Hypothesis 5: As in Hypothesis 2 participant A's frequency of other-regarding decisions
in the ambiguity treatment will be smaller than in the uncertainty treatment in both the
situations where i) the other-regarding choice is rightward and is not ambiguous and ii)
the situation where the other-regarding choice is centerward and becomes ambiguous.
Unlike other experiments, we do not start with a baseline reference deterministic
treatment with high other-regarding interest. We do have a different type of high other-regarding
baseline treatment that removes self-interest from the choices and examines subjects’ choice
made solely over other-regarding decisions.
However, the experimental design allows us to use a high other-regarding baseline in
which decisions are made where the decision maker’s own welfare is not affected by the choice
(the self-indifferent scenario, as their compensation is the same for either decision) compared to
the decision maker’s actions in treatments where self-interested and other-regarding decisions
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are in opposite directions. We will examine this under both the uncertainty and the ambiguity
treatments. This self-indifference treatment is a measure of the decision maker’s level of care in
acting on behalf of the other participant to maximize the other participant’s compensation. The
treatments continue to include uncertainty and ambiguity in the payment to the other participant;
however there is no self-interested reason to use these devices to avoid maximizing the other
participant’s expected compensation. Although we expect most participants to exert some effort
to pick the choice most favorable to the other participant, it is possible that some participant for
various reasons may not be exerting this level of care for others or may have some other
systematic bias.
Hypothesis 6: Participant A's frequency of other-regarding decisions in the opposinginterests treatment is less than in the self-indifferent treatment, this should hold across all
other treatment scenarios.
Hypothesis 6 will be tested on each different treatment: with uncertainty and with
ambiguity, with rightward and centerward other-regarding choices, and on all subtotals as well.
In addition to the baseline directional bias tested in Hypothesis 3 and 4 we should test for
and expect no or minimal directional bias in the self-indifferent treatments. It is important to
understand any baseline bias, so as to control for it in our interpretation of the results.
Hypothesis 7: Participant A's frequency of other-regarding decisions in the selfindifferent treatments will be consistent independent of the direction of the otherregarding choice.
Unlike in Hypothesis 2 and 5 where we expect the decision maker to take advantage of
the additional complexities of ambiguity to make fewer other-regarding choices; in the self82

indifference treatment there is no reason to differentiate the level of other-regarding behavior
between the uncertain and ambiguous treatments. We would want to be cognizant of any bias
when interpreting the results.
Hypothesis 8: Participant A's frequency of other-regarding decisions in the selfindifferent treatments will be consistent and independent of the uncertain and ambiguous
treatments.
For robustness we also check by fitting a logit model of the observed behavior to the data and
interacted terms (pairs of payment and treatment variables were interacted so that this combined term only
had the payment amount or treatment conditional on the other treatment also being present). The test was
to see if the presence of ambiguity interacted with opposing interest (based on Hypothesis 2 this is where
we expect to differentiate decisions in the ambiguous treatment from the uncertain treatment) had any
effect on the choice variable with controls for other variables in the model.
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∙ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 + 𝜀
Where α is the coefficient of interest for the interaction that this is an ambiguous opposing
treatment, β is the coefficient for all the other X control covariate variables and ε is the residual error.
Hypothesis 9: In opposing-interest situations, participant A makes less frequent otherregarding choices in the ambiguity treatments: 𝛼 < 0
There are several ways to quantify and test these hypotheses. The fundamental design of
the experiment is based on the idea of a multiple-price list similar to that used in Holt and Laury,
2002 [31]. In that experiment they were looking at the switchover point between safe and risky
option to measure the degree of risk aversion for a decision maker. Here we can look at the
switchover point between other-regarding and self-interested choices to measure their other83

regarding behavior. In our experiment to control for any anchoring bias and question-order bias
we present the individual question of the multiple-price list individually and in a different
random order for each subject. One way of testing hypotheses would be to compare the
switchover point – the point on our price list of self-interested pay where the dictator switches
between making the self-interested choice and making the other-regarding choice; and then
comparing this switchover point between the ambiguous and uncertain test treatments. A similar
metric would simply be to compare the number of other-regarding choices in the two treatments.
Our random order presentation of questions does not control for a single switching point for each
subject in the way that a single multiple-price list could (such as that used by Holt and Laury).
Thus, it was easier to compare the total number of other-regarding choices in the two
experiments, rather than construct some artificial data method to deal with multiple switching
points in an individual subjects’ data. We also examined an alternative specification of the
regression using both the first or last switching point, and the results were similar to those
presented.
Examining the 8 scenarios where participant A’s interest is opposite the interest of
participant B, we counted the number of other-regarding decisions participant A makes. See
Figure 3 for Scenarios 1-4 where the other-regarding choices are rightward and for Scenarios 1417 where the other-regarding choices are centerward. In this treatment known probabilities
determined participant B’s payment. The details of this analysis are in the results section.
In the second treatment, we shift to ambiguous probabilities; we will test if ambiguities
weaken participant A’s culpability possibly through allowing the decision maker to form beliefs
or focus thoughts within the ambiguities, wiggle room that their self-interested choices are also
benefiting the other participant.
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Figure 3 Opposing Interest 8 Ball-Color-Pay Scenarios
The second row gives the expected payments to participant B when participant A choses the
center or the right ball color. The columns show the payment options to participant A in each of
8 scenarios.

The statistical analysis in the next section will compare the number of other-regarding
choices in the two treatments, uncertainty, and ambiguity, over the 8 scenarios where the expert
and client have opposing financial interests. See Figure 4 for the payments, probabilities
(determined by the number of balls of each color) and expected payments associated with these
comparison scenarios.

85

Figure 4 Opposing-Interest 16 Ball-Color-Pay Scenarios
The second row gives the expected payments to participant B when participant A choses the
center or the right ball color. The columns show the payment options to participant A in each of
16 scenarios.

When examining the self-indifferent treatment in Hypotheses 6-8 our comparison statistic
will be the frequency of other-regarding choices in Scenarios 5, 13, 22, and 30.
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The Wilcoxon signed rank test and the student’s t-test test are used to test both the
median and mean or the results respectively.
2.6 Results
As described in the theory section we are measuring the behavior of decisions in
situations with uncertainty and ambiguity by counting the frequency of other-regarding choices
made. The choice is either an other-regarding decision (coded 1) or a self-interested decision
(coded 0, in the self-indifferent treatment this is the not other-regarding choice); see Figure 4 for
a description of the uncertainty and ambiguity scenarios.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the number of other-regarding choices made by our 33
subjects. Each subject had 8 opposing-interest decisions in the uncertainty treatment and then 8
more in the ambiguity treatment.

Figure 5 Dictators ranked by total number of other-regarding choices they made.
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In Figure 6, we have also separated out the 4 decisions made when the rightward choice
is other-regarding (scenarios 1-4 uncertainty and scenarios 18-21 where ambiguity is the
opposite choice – the center choice) and the 4 decisions made when the center choice is otherregarding (scenarios 14-17 uncertainty and scenarios 31-34 where this is also the ambiguous
choice). As can be seen by inspection, sometimes decision makers make other-regarding choices
in the uncertain treatment, on average in 3.12 of the 8 decisions or 39% of the time the dictator
selects the other-regarding choice giving up some of their own welfare to do so. The standard
deviation is 2.84 and this is significantly different from zero at the 0.0001% level. Decision
makers make some other-regarding choices under uncertainty – Hypothesis 1 is not rejected.

Figure 6 Dictators ranked by the number of other-regarding choices made by scenario type.

As would be expected, the frequency of other-regarding choices made by participant
dictators was affected by the cost of this action to their own welfare, see Figure 7. As the cost of
making an other-regarding choice decreases and eventually became a self-benefit, more dictators
made the other- regarding choice. It should also be noted that the graphs for the uncertainty
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treatment and the ambiguity treatment are similar. When tested in the subsequent statistical
evaluation, the results not statistically distinguishable.

Figure 7 Frequency of other-regarding action for each cost to the dictator under ambiguity and
uncertainty treatments.

The four columns in Table 17 have several comparisons of decisions with uncertainty
versus decisions with the ambiguity treatments. The first two columns are just different
aggregations of the total data split parallel to the difference in Figure 5 and Figure 6. A student’s
t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test examine Hypothesis 2. In all 4 tests we observe no
significant differences, rejecting Hypothesis 2 (even if a one-sided test were used to test the
hypothesis of a decrease in other-regarding choices, this would also be rejected) – decisions
under ambiguity and uncertainty are not statistically distinguishable.
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Table 17 Wiggle Under Test Treatment Ambiguity vs. Uncertainty Control.
Comparison of other-regarding choices between uncertainty and ambiguity (top three rows) and
statistical analysis (below).

In Table 17, the 3rd column examines Hypothesis 5-i with rightward other-regarding
choices that are not ambiguous, and the 4th column examines Hypothesis 5-ii about centerward
Other-Regarding choices that switch to being ambiguously defined.24 As with Hypothesis 1, the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (that compares medians) of Hypothesis 5 rejects the hypothesis above
the 10% level. However, in the Hypothesis 5-i t-test in column 3 there is a tendency for
rightward Other-Regarding switch to ambiguity in the mean, but the t-Test is not statistically

24

It should be noted that for the test of Hypothesis 1 the rightward and centerward data in
columns 3 and 4 are aggregated but treated as separate frequency samples in the 2nd column and
are combined by participant into a single frequency per participant in the 1st column. The
resulting average frequency is the same and though the number of data points in the sample is
now larger, even with the increased sample size the tests have very similar results.
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significant (p = 0.077) whereas Hypothesis 5-ii in the opposite direction tested in column 4 is
rejected.
Switching to Table 18 and continuing the examination of Hypothesis 5, the first opposing
interests section of Table 18 transposes the same data as in Table 17. In the ambiguity treatment
in the last column the decision chosen is moving towards the center choice [the factor is higher
on the second (center choice) row than on the first (right choice) row] with 1-5 possible balls in
the urn determining the probability of the others-favorable payment away from the rightward
choice that has 5 balls, a one-third chance for a favorable other payment. They are moving
towards an option that would be unfavorable for the other in most cases, 1-4 balls, and might be
equivalent for the other only in the maximum possible case of 5 balls. The decision makers are
overestimating the value of the 1-5 balls relative to uncertainty when the similar treatment had 3
balls for the centerward option, and they were choosing the rightward 5 balls option instead at
slightly higher frequencies. However, this tendency is not significant (p = 0.086)
Some dictator participants took mild advantage of the ambiguity by making an
insignificant increase in centerward self-interested choices when the outcome of that choice that
they are switched to is ambiguous for the other participants payment. They were not taking
advantage of ambiguity to switch away from the centerward other-regarding choice in the
Hypothesis 5-ii scenarios when the choice they were making under uncertainty becomes
ambiguous about the payment to the other. Although this is not the full flexibility of the use of
ambiguity that we expected, this is nevertheless a shifting use of ambiguity indicating that there
is not a single opinion or bias about ambiguity, but rather there is an overriding self-interested
preference in all scenarios.
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Though we take issue with Haisley and Weber, 2010 [29], a double-lottery treatment not really
falling under the strict definition of ambiguity, the two experiments can be compared – the two
experiments are different, but both add more complex elements to the underlying uncertainty-probabilities
treatment. The alignment of elements in the Haisley and Weber experiment isclosest to our test in
Hypothesis 5-i. Their experiment only tests situations similar to Scenarios # 18-21 where their more
complex double lottery (labeled ambiguity) is the self-interested choice, and they find a
significant increase in self-interested choices in this treatment where we observe an insignificant
increase in self-interested choices switching towards less valuable, ambiguous other payments.
The findings in Haisley and Weber are at least in line with our findings in loosely related tests. They do
not test the symmetrical case where ambiguity aligns with the other-regarding choices such as
our Hypothesis 5-ii where we observe no difference in behavior.
Testing Hypothesis 3 concerning the consistency of choices to the direction of ambiguity
in the third column of Table 18, just as for Hypothesis 5-i we observe an insignificant difference
(p = 8.6%), not quite rejecting the consistency hypothesis. As noted in the discussion of
Hypothesis 5-i, the behavior in Scenarios # 18-21 would appear to be different than either the
similar treatments with only the direction of ambiguity switched (falling just short of rejecting
Hypothesis 3) and different from the similar treatment that only switches to uncertainty (falling
just short of rejecting Hypothesis 5-i). It would appear that this is the outlying choice where
behavior may exhibit changes, though just short of being significant.
Testing Hypothesis 4 concerning the consistency of choices independent of the direction
in the uncertainty treatments in the second column of Table 18, the consistency of choice is not
rejected. When other-regarding-is-right is tested against other-regarding-is-center to see if they
are different, the difference is rejected (t-test is 0.89).
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The next section of Table 18 shows the decision made by dictator participant A when
their own welfare is indifferent as they received the same compensation for either decision. This
self-indifferent behavior is compared against the opposing-interest results (the first section of this
table), the results are in the last section of Table 18 showing the Students t-tests for the various
treatment groups; all behaviors are found to be significantly different at or in most cases
significantly below the 1.3% level, and thus Hypothesis 6 is not rejected. Self-indifferent
decision makers are making other-regarding choices at a much higher frequency than in the
opposing-interest treatments, this being true for all combinations of uncertainty or ambiguity as
well as for either the center or rightward choice being other-regarding.
Testing Hypothesis 7 concerning the consistency of choices independent of the direction
of Other-Regarding choice in the self-indifferent treatment the t-test are in the last line of the
middle self-indifference section of Table 18 (the t-tests are 62%, 16%, and 8.3%). Again,
ambiguity showed a slight but insignificant difference between the choice when the OtherRegarding choice that aligns or does not align with the ambiguity treatment, for the uncertain
case and grand total cases we do not find any difference and thus do not reject the consistent
choices Hypothesis 7.
For Hypothesis 8 concerning the consistency of self-indifferent choices independent of
the uncertain or ambiguous treatments, we compare the uncertainty results in the second column
with the ambiguity results in the third column for the middle self-indifference section of Table
18. The t-tests p values not show in the table are 0.096, 0.17, and 1.00, for the rightward,
centerward and all rows respectively. This is similar to Hypothesis 5-i when the Other-Regarding
choice has a non-significant tendency only in the rightward direction. Here for Hypothesis 8
when the dictators are self-indifferent about the choices there is a slight insignificant tendency
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for some directional differences particularly the rightward case. This might indicate that even in
the absence of self-interest, motivation decision makers are overestimating the value of this less
favorable ambiguous alternative to the welfare of the other. However, this may be reading too
much into the complex insignificant results. For the Other-Regarding-is-centerward case and the
grand total cases we do not reject the consistent choices Hypothesis 8.
Despite the failure of Hypothesis 2 for behavior under ambiguity to exhibit differentiation from
the behavior under uncertainty we still need to check for such behavior with a logit model in Hypothesis 9
as the additional control variables in the model might be able to isolate any change in behavior driven by
the switch from uncertainty to ambiguity. As might be suspected, there was no significance to 𝛼, the
ambiguity-opposing interest coefficient, again indicating that there was no significant difference between
the behavior under the ambiguity and uncertain treatments. See Table 22 in the Appendix, we ran twelve
different variations on the model and in no case was 𝛼 significantly different from zero at the 95%
confidence level.
Further robustness checks are also included in the Appendix Table 17 and Table 18. Not
surprisingly we did find that participants were making a self-interested choice, not a rightward or
centerward choice; see Table 18 and Table 21 in the Appendix that being the only cases where we found
significance.
2.7 Conclusion
The expert behavior, dictators’ choice, is equally self-interested when the question at
hand contains uncertainty or contains ambiguity. Neither the expert nor the client would be better
off if the expert or a third party invested in research or education to alleviate the ambiguity by
clarifying the probabilities of the uncertain outcomes; the expert behavior does not become more
other-regarding nor does it become more self-interested.
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This result is essentially different than the findings of Haisley and Weber, 2010 [29]
although the insignificant differences in behavior that we did find were consistent with Haisley and
Weber’s observations. Their double lottery has some complexity similarities to our Ellsberg ambiguity
treatment. When treated with this double lottery or our ambiguity, both experiments observe an increase
in the self-interested choice. Haisley and Weber observed a significant increase where we observed an
insignificant increase. Although the levels of significance and designs of the experiment are quite different,
it is reassuring that we see something slightly similar in the homologous treatments.
By using ambiguity with unknown probabilities, we distinguish our experiment from Haisley and
Weber, 2010 [29] where they instead used nested double lottery that is really just a more complex lottery.
Further by designing the experiment symmetrically to distinguish ambiguity from self-interest wiggle
room, we are able to isolate these behaviors; whereas in Haisley and Weber, 2010 [29] the double lottery is
always aligned with the self-interested action and is thus indistinguishable. Overall, our results reject a
difference in choices under ambiguity when compared to uncertainty, though in a very narrow situation we
find a small marginal increase in self-interested choices using ambiguity as a wiggle room cover to justify
this action.
There is a robust difference to other-regarding choices in the presence of indifference
compared to the presence of an opposing Self-Interested choice, in all cases the difference is
significant to the 1% level, and in the full data set and other scenarios, it is significant to the
0.01% level. The point here is that the observed behavior is overwhelmingly being driven by
self-interest choices in all ambiguous and uncertain treatments where a self-interested choice is
available.
Our experiment has found that ambiguity is not the cause of a shift towards self-interested choices
when there is a mechanism present that allows for wiggle room. We suggest that this self-interested wiggle
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room shift is primarily made possible by uncertainty, and that the addition of ambiguity plays little role. To
strengthen the findings and extend the conclusions to addressing the role of uncertainty, this experiment
would benefit from including choices where there are single deterministic outcomes that do not facilitate
wiggle room behavior. We did not run the traditional control of certain payments confirmed
throughout the literature to exhibit strong other-regarding behavior. We did run a control where
the dictators’ payments were constant whatever choice was made, so there was no reason not to
make the other-regarding choice. However, as can be seen the self-indifference treatments
reported in Table 18 the dictators are not all making the other-regarding choice although a large
majority do make the other-regarding choice. In the aligned interest case, some dictators even
fail to make the choice that would benefit both participants.
Other experiments have consistently shown that participants make more self-interested choices in
uncertain situations with known probabilities when compared to choices with deterministic single
outcomes (Dana et al. 2007 [16], Haisley and Weber 2010 [29], Krawczyk & Le Lec 2008 [38], Karni et
al. 2008 [33]). Although we have not run deterministic treatment frames in this experiment, we presume
that our subjects are using both the uncertain and ambiguous situations to make more self-interested
choices than they would in a deterministic framing where they would situationally feel more obligation to
make other-regarding choices so as to preserve the appearance of propriety.
These experiments might show more significance were additional experiments performed or were
the experiments repeated in list format where a single crossing point was chosen. The experiment would
probably also benefit from a “control” treatment with certain outcomes for the choices. Finally, there might
be some ideas to treat either or both the ambiguity and uncertainty treatments in ways to promote more
other-regarding behavior. In Cox et. al., 2016 [13], for gastrointestinal ward-discharge decisions, the
decision process had a computer probability and expected payment benefit based recommended action.
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Doctors using this system when overriding the recommendation are required to affirm their choice with a
written explanation justifying their decision. Even without auditing the written explanations, Cox et. al.
found in test experiments with real medical charts (but without the patient) that this method optimized the
decision of when to override the computer's recommendation.
Unfortunately, as no difference was found between the ambiguous and uncertain
treatments, treating ambiguous situations with information discovery to make them uncertain
would not be anticipated to improve the recipient participant B’s outcome.
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APPENDIX

A.1 Recommendations – Methods Appendix
By using these carefully designed pairs of tasks we are able to thwart any concerns that
experts might be making rational other-regarding recommendations based on their assumptions
about the utility preferences of their clients. We exclude the possibility that experts could just be
acting on their assumption about their client’s utility; we eliminate the possibility that the selfinterested recommendation is really the “fault” is the experts’ “extreme” assumptions about their
client’s utility and not the expert’s own self-interest and lack of other-regarding concerns. Thus,
when an expert is self-interested in both tasks in our opposing paired task, the actions can be
identified as genuinely self-interested. There is no longer an unlikely utility preference
assumption to hide self-interest behind. By eliminating this concern, we will be able to focus on
the effect of communication on the quality of recommendations.
We examine the incompatibility of the two paired self-interested recommendations under
constant relative risk aversion’s (CRRA) isoelastic power utility function assumptions in the
same way risk aversion is measured in Holt and Laury, 2002 [31], Risk aversion and incentive
effects, and elsewhere. We further show that self-interested recommendations in the opposite
paired task are also incompatible under constant absolute risk aversion’s (CARA) exponential
utility function, see the appendix. We also examine less parametric preferences, such as some
simple rules of thumb, similarly concluding that other-regarding concern for the client’s
alternative utility preferences would still be incompatible with making both paired self-interested
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recommendations. Thus, we systematically eliminate several alternative interpretations or
rationalizations for what recommendations are motivated by self-interest so that we can more
accurately identify and measure the effect of communication on any potential self-interested
actions.
The tradeoff between other and own compensation (a choice of $5 more to other versus
$1 more to self) are selected to be a little bit larger than the standard tradeoff in many other
experiments where frequently the effective choice is between an additional $3 payment to the
other versus $1 payment to self. In this experiment we are testing more complex multiple levels
of additional task and treatments where we are hoping to observe a slow progression from the
other-regarding behavior at the baseline to more self-interested recommendations as each
additional complexity of the tasks and treatments adds additional wiggle room. In the prior
experiments often subjects reached their saturated self-interested level with any wiggle room
treatment, and thus if we were to use these “standard” tradeoffs we would not be able to
distinguish between the levels of behavior with multiple and different task and treatments.
We want to be able to layer levels of additional wiggle room and observe additional
motion with each layer of wiggle room. In the other experiments in the literature with $3:$1 the
decision makers in a transparent decision start out with the majority (about 70%) being otherregarding and then the majority saturate their self-interested behavior at the first occurrence of
wiggle room (at about 70% self-interested). A small group of decision makers remaining otherregarding continuing to give up $1 so that the other can receive $3 under any treatment. This
results in a switch in about 40% of the subjects. In general, the experiments don’t observe subject
being more than 70% self-interested or more than 70% other-regarding. Presuming that we will
observe similar saturation on the end points, we want to with each task or treatment to add a
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layer of additional wiggle room, thus being able to observe additional self-interested action. In
this design we want less than all 40% of the subjects who are responding to wiggle room to
switch with the first (uncertain) task that provides the first layer of wiggle room. We want to be
able to observe additional or different levels of self-interest when we add the communication
treatment or when we move through the six different tasks.
If we run a “test” experiment (to observe if the $5:$1 other-regarding tradeoff is
appropriate), we should also run a second round/treatment where the expert and clients will both
be fully information and will select what option they would like to select for themselves.
Participant would not be informed about the second round/treatment until after the first
round/treatment. This should be sufficient to confirm “comprehension” and hopefully nearly
100% client choice of the E(A) = $10 option. As we agreed we don’t need the self-selection data,
though showing understanding of the setup will help exclude simple confusion as another selfinterested excuse. In this preliminary “test” we would pay one random task from each of the two
treatments/rounds.
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A.2 Wiggle Room - Robustness check investigate other sources of observed behavior.

Table 19 Test Treatment Ambiguity Averse (rightward) vs. Uncertainty Control.

In Table 19 we are checking if the dictator’s decisions are based on a more rightward or
more centerward choice when comparing the uncertain control against the ambiguity treatment.
The test is similar to Table 17 except that in Table 17 self-interested was coded as 1, in Table 19
rightward is coded as 1. Thus, the direction switches for Scenarios 1-4 and 18-21. As can be
noted from columns 3 and 4, the behavior is not similar in that Scenarios 1-4 are making the
same frequency of rightward choices as Scenarios 14-17, the same also being true for the
ambiguous treatment. Just as in Table 17 with the self-interested behavior, there is little
difference between the rightward behavior in the uncertain and ambiguous treatments.
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Table 20 Test Symmetry of Other-Regarding Center vs. Right.

In There is more positive information about the rightward choice than the centerward
choice, the probability is constant and is known by the recipient whereas the probability of
centerward choice is changing in some cases is ambiguous and is not known by the recipient.
Thus, there might be a theory that the dictator might make choices favoring this more positive
information. We test this issue two ways in Table 20 the test is to see within each of the two
treatments (ambiguity and uncertainty) if there is a difference between the Center and Rightward
choices when they are the self-interested choice. In Table 21 we test if there is a centerward or
rightward bias within each of the two treatments (ambiguity and uncertainty). On average
dictators are choosing self-interestedly, thus when measuring a self-interested choice (rightward)
against an other-regarding choice (rightward), it is clear they are making a self-interested choice
not a rightward choice whereas in Table 19 the centerward versus rightward choices are mostly
not distinguishable.
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Table 21 Test Symmetry of Rightward Certainty of Other
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Table 22 Test Treatment Ambiguity Wiggle vs. Control
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